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The Appearance of Appearances
Michael Ariens*
ABSTRACT
The Framers argued judicial independence was necessary to the
success of the American democratic experiment. Independence required
judges possess and act with integrity. One aspect of judicial integrity was
impartiality. Impartial judging was believed crucial to public confidence
that the decisions issued by American courts followed the rule of law.
Public confidence in judicial decision making promoted faith and belief in
an independent judiciary. The greater the belief in the independent
judiciary, the greater the chance of continued success of the republic.
During the nineteenth century, state constitutions, courts, and legislatures
slowly expanded the instances in which a judge was deemed partial, and
thus ineligible to act. One such instance was actual bias: a judge was to
avoid favoring one party or disfavoring another. Close behind the duty to
avoid actual bias was the duty of judges to avoid creating a suspicion of
unfairness or bias. Public suspicion that a judge was biased, even if untrue,
lowered public confidence in judicial integrity and thus, judicial
independence. The American Bar Association adopted that understanding
in its 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics. Canon 4 challenged judges to avoid
both “impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” The difficulty of
applying an appearance of impropriety standard was found in the very
making of the Canons. One proposed canon was modified before ABA
approval even though it was an excellent example of why judges should
avoid an appearance of impropriety. The Canons were premised on the
ideal that a judge was to act honorably; avoiding improper appearances
maintained the judge’s honor. The Canons served as guidelines for judges,
as standards subjectively interpreted by them and applied to their personal
and professional lives. They were not intended to serve as rules to sanction
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or discipline judges for actual or perceived misconduct. For the next halfcentury, the Canons largely served this limited purpose. In 1972, the ABA
adopted a Code of Judicial Conduct, supplanting the Canons. Most states
adopted the Code as law. The duty to avoid creating an appearance of
impropriety was part of the 1972 Code, and its importance rose. Both
supervising courts and newly-created judicial conduct commissions often
assessed charges of judicial misconduct through the lens of the appearance
standard. The ABA’s 1990 Model Code altered its 1972 iteration by
emphasizing the positivist aspect of the Code: any Canon or Section (rule)
written in terms of “shall” was mandatory. The duty to avoid an
appearance of impropriety was found in Canon 2 of the 1990 Model Code.
Judges were regularly disciplined for violating Canon 2. In the ABA’s
2007 reformation of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, commenters
debated the efficacy of “appearance of impropriety.” The ABA joint
commission reforming the Code went back and forth before deciding to
split the baby: Canon 1 declared as an aspirational goal the avoidance of
an appearance of impropriety, but no judge was subject to discipline for
failing to do so. This approach was strongly opposed, and the ABA hastily
reversed course. It amended Rule 1.2 to declare that a judge “shall
avoid . . . the appearance of impropriety.” Nearly all states have adopted
some appearance of impropriety standard. For a half-century, failing to
avoid the appearance of impropriety has been central to disqualifying and
disciplining judges. This paper investigates the origins of the “appearance
of impropriety” standard, its modest development, and its vigorous use
since the rise of modern judicial ethics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 7, 2007, less than a week before the American Bar
Association (ABA) House of Delegates was to vote on the revision of its
Model Code of Judicial Ethics, the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ)
adopted a resolution opposing the proposed revision.1 The CCJ is
composed of the “highest judicial officer” of the states, commonwealths,
territories, and district of the United States.2 The CCJ resolved that it
“opposes any revised version of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct that
does not include a provision requiring avoidance of impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety both as an aspirational goal for judges and as a
basis for disciplinary enforcement.”3 Canon 1 of the proposed 2007 Model
Code stated, in part, a judge “shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety.” As proposed, the Code lacked a disciplinary rule adding
some teeth to this aspirational goal. The ABA Joint Commission had gone
back and forth on the value of making a judge subject to discipline for an
appearance of impropriety.4 The CCJ’s opposition, however, threatened
to crater the Joint Commission’s work.5 Few states would likely adopt the
Model Code in the face of such opposition.6
1. The Professionalism and Competence of the Bar Comm. of the
Conf. of Chief Justs., Resol. 3, Opposing the Report of the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct in Light of its Failure to Provide for Enforceability of the Canon on
“Appearance
of
Impropriety”
(Feb.
7,
2007),
https://ccj.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/23710/02072007-opposing-report-aba-jointcommission-judicial-conduct-provide-enforceability.pdf [https://perma.cc/F52K-G64V] [hereinafter
Resol. 3]; Nancy J. Moore, Is the Appearance of Impropriety Standard an Appropriate Standard for
Disciplining Judges in the Twenty-First Century?, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 286–87 (2010); THE
CENTER FOR JUDICIAL ETHICS OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, Model Code
Anniversary,
JUD.
ETHICS
&
DISCIPLINE
(Mar.
21,
2017),
https://ncscjudicialethicsblog.org/2017/03/21/model-code-anniversary/
[https://perma.cc/6GH2AHYT] (noting the objection of the Conference of Chief Justices).
2. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, https://ccj.ncsc.org/ [https://perma.cc/R7C3-X8P2] (last
visited Mar. 3, 2022).
3. Resol. 3, supra note 1.
4. Proceedings of the Sixty-Eighth Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 132:1 A.B.A.
ANN. REP. 27–28 (2007) (recounting part of the history); see infra Section IV.A (noting indecision
regarding appearance of impropriety); CHARLES [G.] GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS’
NOTES TO THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 4 (2009) (“[T]he Commission ultimately agreed
to an amendment proposed on the floor of the House of Delegates creating a Rule directing judges to
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”). If this is in conflict, I lean to the version
found in the Proceedings.
5. See Charles G. Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. LITIG. 671,
695 n.97 (2011) (citing Editorial, The A.B.A.’s Judicial Ethics Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/09/opinion/09fri3.html
[https://perma.cc/H25D-25C6]
(fulminating about the absence of a rule regarding avoiding an appearance of impropriety apparently
also had some impact).
6. Moore, supra note 1, at 287 n.10.
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The ABA quickly caved. The Joint Commission altered proposed Rule
1.2 to read: “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary,
and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”7 In the
House of Delegates, an effort was made to amend this version of Rule 1.2
to its pre-CCJ resolution language.8 It failed. The House of Delegates
then adopted the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, as altered, to meet CCJ
approval.9
This Article investigates the history of the idea that American judges
should avoid both impropriety and its appearance from the late eighteenth
century to the early twentieth century. The proscription against the
appearance of impropriety was at the core of the ABA’s 1924 Canons of
Judicial Ethics (1924 Canons). This Article then explains why the duty to
avoid creating an appearance of impropriety was rarely enforced by
judicial sanction, judicial disqualification, or reversal of judgment until the
1970s. Since then, courts and newly-created state judicial conduct
commissions—governmental bodies that regulate judicial conduct—
regularly note the appearance of impropriety as a reason for disciplining
judges.
The ABA has issued versions of the Code of Judicial Conduct in 1972,
1990, and 2007.10 Each has required judges to avoid an appearance of
impropriety, though only in 2007 was this the subject of significant
division. Additionally, each version has been written in ever-greater legal
phrasing. States have relied heavily on the ABA’s Codes in crafting
enforceable judicial conduct standards and the vast majority have adopted
either the 1990 or 2007 Code editions.
The appearance of appearances in Canon 2 of the 1990 Model Code
helped trigger the later controversy: did the appearance of impropriety
standard remain a valuable touchstone in matters of judicial discipline?
The appearance of impropriety standard has been regularly used as a
source of judicial discipline since the CCJ’s successful effort in 2007, but
its necessity to discipline judges remains unproven.

7. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
8. Proceedings of the Sixty-Eighth Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 132:1 A.B.A
ANN. REP. 27–28 (2007).
9. Id. at 29.
10. Some modest amendments were adopted in 2010. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
(AM.
BAR
ASS’N
2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judici
al_conduct/ [https://perma.cc/5J7J-LQYN].
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II. THE APPEARANCE OF APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY
A. American Origins of the Appearance of Judicial Bias or
Impropriety
“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to
be both judges and parties at the same time . . . .”11 James Madison’s
declaration in The Federalist Papers repeated a long-held belief in
Western legal thought. By noting the judge’s interest “would certainly
bias his judgment,” and “not improbably, corrupt his integrity,” Madison
made a broader point: Human beings are not angels, but biased and
corruptible when judging their own interests. Implicitly, Madison argued
the certainty of bias and probability of corruption of one’s integrity needed
to be checked if the American democratic experiment was to succeed.
Judicial integrity promotes public confidence in the American judicial
system. One aspect of judicial integrity is judicial impartiality. A partial
judge, one biased or corrupt, lessens public confidence in the judicial
system. The judge’s duty to sit impartially has deep roots.12
What did it mean to serve as an impartial magistrate in the new United
States? In the early national period, and continuing through the early
twentieth century, courts and legislatures slowly broadened the
understanding of partial judging. A 1792 Act of Congress required a
district court judge to remove himself, if requested by either party, from a
case when it appeared that “the judge of such court is, any ways, concerned
in interest, or has been of counsel for either party.”13 Nearly thirty years
later, Congress broadened the instances in which the judge was declared
partial by adding, “or is so related to, or connected with, either party, as
to render it improper for him, in his opinion, to sit on the trial of such suit
11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2009).
12. See, e.g., Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N.Y. 549, 549–50 (1850):
The first idea in the administration of justice is that a judge must necessarily be free from
all bias and partiality. He can not be both judge and party, arbiter and advocate in the same
cause. Mankind are so agreed in this principle, that any departure from it shocks their
common sense and sentiment of justice.
See also Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 428–29 (1995) (citing several Western
authorities, including Blaise Pascal and William Blackstone).
13. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278–79:
That in all suits and actions in any district court of the United States, in which it shall
appear that the judge of such court is, any ways, concerned in interest, or has been of
counsel for either party, it shall be the duty of the judge on application of either party, to
cause the fact to be entered on the minutes of the court . . . .
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or action.”14 This 1821 amendment made it clear that it was the judge’s
sole decision to recuse himself, and the crux of the matter was whether a
judge who found himself in such a situation believed it “improper” to
preside.
States wrestled with the question of the propriety of a judge presiding
in a case in which a party was “related to, or connected with,” the judge.
After some debate, New York courts concluded that a judgment in favor
of the party related to the judge should be reversed.15 As declared in a
mid-nineteenth century New Hampshire case:
It is so obvious a principle of justice, that all persons who are to act as
judges, should be impartial, without any interest of their own in the
matter in controversy, and without any such connexion with the parties
in interest, as would be likely, improperly, to influence their judgment,
that it is hardly possible to doubt that such impartiality was required by
the Common Law.16

When New York revised its statutes in 1829, it expanded the instances
in which a judge was deemed to lack impartiality: “No judge of any court
can sit as such, in any cause to which he is a party, or in which he is
interested, or in which he would be excluded from being a juror by reason
of consanguinity or affinity to either of the parties . . . .”17 The degree of
kinship between the judge and the party triggering the judge’s ineligibility
to sit broadened over time. A New York court later justified the policy
undergirding this statutory provision: “Its design, spirit and object was to
prevent corruption and favor in our courts of justice, and to free them
entirely from even a suspicion of bias or partiality.”18 In subsequent
14. Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643, 643:
That in all suits and actions in any district court of the United States, in which it shall
appear that the judge of such court is any ways concerned in interest, or has been of counsel
for either party, or is so related to, or connected with, either party, as to render it improper
for him, in his opinion, to sit on the trial of such suit or action, it shall be the duty of such
judge, on application of either party, to cause the fact to be entered on the records of the
court . . . .
See also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543–44 (1994) (recounting the history of the statute).
15. Compare Pierce v. Sheldon, 13 Johns. 191, 191 (N.Y. App. Div. 1813) (“Whether the justice
was legally disqualified, on the ground that the plaintiff below was his son-in-law, is, perhaps,
questionable; but the gross indecency of an exercise of his judicial power, in such a case, should induce
this Court to scrutinize his proceedings with a jealous eye.”) with Bellows & Hopkins v. Pearson, 19
Johns. 172, 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 1821) (“That the Justice, who admitted that he was the son-in-law of
the plaintiff, insisted on retaining jurisdiction, was, of itself, evidence, that the trial was not fair and
impartial. The judgment, ought, therefore, to be reversed.”).
16. Sanborn v. Fellows, 2 Fost. 473, 481 (N.H. 1851).
17. An Act Concerning Courts and Ministers of Justice, and Proceedings in Civil Cases, 2 N.Y.
REV. STATS. 204, Pt. III, ch. III, title 1, § 2 (1829).
18. Schoonmaker v. Clearwater & Wood, 41 Barb. 200, 206 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1863).
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sections of this statute, the New York legislature limited the authority of
appellate judges to act when a claim of partiality arose, largely prevented
a judge from acting as counsel in his court, and banned the judge’s law
partner from representing one of the parties in the court where the judge
presided.19
In Carrington v. Andrews, the judge’s prior representation of a party
as counsel in the case impaired the public’s trust in the judicial system.
The court approvingly recited an 1847 New York law, which stated in part,
“no judge of any court shall have a voice in the decision of any cause in
which he has been counsel, attorney, or solicitor, or in the subject-matter
of which he is interested.”20 The Carrington court noted the sentiments of
the statute agreed with the common law. It concluded:
[F]or a magistrate to partici pate [sic] unnecessarily in the decision of a
cause in which he had acted as counsel or attorney, would be deemed
such evidence of bias or partiality, and so far calculated to impair public
confidence in the administration of justice, as to require the reversal of
the judgment.21

One of the cases positively cited in Carrington was the 1836 case of
People ex rel. Roe & Roe v. The Suffolk Common Pleas.22 In Roe, the
losing defendant asked the justice who presided at trial, an attorney at law,
to prepare affidavits needed to request a writ of certiorari.23 The affidavits
had to allege some error, and the justice who presided was required to
answer all the facts alleged in the affidavits. He agreed, and did so. When
the plaintiff complained about the judge’s twofold role, the court held
certiorari should be quashed.24 In circumstances such as these:
[T]he act complained of was calculated to impair the confidence of the
opposite party in the impartiality of the officer, which is of itself an evil
which should be carefully avoided. Next in importance to the duty of
rendering a righteous judgment, is that of doing it in such a manner as
will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.25

A second case cited in Carrington was Oakley v. Aspinwall.26 In

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

2 N.Y. REV. STATS. 204, at §§ 3–5.
Carrington v. Andrews, 12 Abb. Pr. 348, 348 (Cnty. Ct. N.Y. 1861).
Id.
18 Wend. 550 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836).
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551, 553.
Id. at 552.
3 N.Y. 547 (N.Y. 1850).
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Oakley, the New York Court of Appeals explained why the judge’s
responsibility went beyond the duty to serve impartially. The design of
the New York legal system was intended “to maintain the purity and
impartiality of the courts.”27 Impartial judging gave the public confidence
that the decisions rendered by the courts followed the law.28 Thus, for
society to thrive, it was necessary that judicial “decisions should be free
from all bias.”29 There existed, in addition, another duty. Once courts
demonstrated the “wisdom and impartiality in their judgments, it [was] of
great importance that the courts should be free from reproach or the
suspicion of unfairness.”30
Both cited cases argued a close connection between actual bias and
the “suspicion of unfairness.”31 Both were often cited favorably by courts
in other states evaluating charges of judicial bias. In 1887, the Supreme
Court of Indiana wrote that judges avoided any suspicion of bias or
unfairness to maintain the “general interests of justice, by preserving the
purity and impartiality of the courts, and the respect and confidence of the
people for their decisions. No judgment is worthy to become a precedent
which is tainted with a suspicion of unfairness.”32 Two decades later, the
court noted suspicion of judicial decisions was a human reaction to human
frailty:
Judges are by no means free from the infirmities of human nature, and,
therefore, it seems to us, that a proper respect for the high positions they
are called upon to fill should induce them to avoid even a cause for
suspicion of bias or prejudice, in the discharge of their judicial duties.33

The Oakley court was more focused on actual bias than the suspicion
27. Id. at 553.
28. Id. at 552.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also In re Dodge & Stevenson Mfg. Co., 77 N.Y. 101, 110 (N.Y. 1879) (noting the
law “carefully guards not only against actual abuses, but even against the appearance of evil, from
which doubt can justly be cast upon the impartiality of judges, or respect for their decisions may be
impaired”). Appearance of evil was used more to refer to the behavior of juries or referees than to
judicial behavior. See, e.g., Dorlon v. Lewis, 9 How. Pr. 1, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851) (calling on referee
“to avoid all improper influences, but even ‘the appearance of evil’”).
31. Oakley, 3 N.Y. at 552; see Roe, 18 Wend. at 551–52.
32. Carr v. Duhme, 78 N.E. 322, 323 (Ind. 1906); see also Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 219 (Mass.
1870).
33. Joyce v. Whitney, 57 Ind. 550, 554 (1877); Heilbron v. Campbell, 23 P. 122, 123 (Cal.
1889):
It should be the duty and desire of every judge to avoid the very appearance of bias,
prejudice, or partiality; and to this end he should decline to sit, or, if he does not, should
be prohibited from sitting, in any case in which his interest in the subject-matter of the
action is such as would naturally influence him either one way or the other.
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of bias, which was where most of the action took place during the latter
half of the nineteenth century—actual bias and corruption in the judiciary.
The successful impeachment (or resignation) of New York City-based
Supreme Court Justices George Barnard, Albert Cardozo, and John
McCunn in 1872 highlighted the primary concern of reformers—some
judges were wholly corrupt.34
Despite the expansion of judicial disqualification through the early
twentieth century, concerns regarding judicial misconduct were regularly
voiced. Judges were the subject of substantial criticism from the late
1890s through much of the 1910s.35 Judicial critics rarely discussed the
suspicion or appearance of bias or impropriety; their energy was spent on
decrying corrupt behavior. One exception was a 1904 law magazine
article.36 The unnamed correspondent promoted the creation of an
“independent” federal circuit court of appeals for the western United
States. The author criticized federal circuit judges for deciding appeals of
cases decided by fellow circuit judges in their capacity as trial judges.
Such behavior, the note concluded, generated an “appearance of bias.”37
A second exception was a 1909 article in the Chicago Legal News on The
Ethics of the Bench.38 It listed several proposed rules of proper conduct
for judges. One stated, “[t]he judge may question the lawyer in the course
of his argument; at the same time the court must avoid all appearance of
bias.”39
In 1908, the ABA adopted its Canons of Professional Ethics for
lawyers.40 It avoided the topic of judicial ethics but encouraged state and
local bar associations to adopt the Canons. The Pennsylvania Bar
Association created a special committee to assess whether to do so.
Committee members disagreed. A majority favored its own approach—a
list of 102 rules of ethical conduct. Rules 90 through 102 concerned rules
of judicial conduct.41 Rule 99 was written quite similarly to the proposal
made in the Chicago Legal News the year before: It permitted a judge to
34. See MICHAEL S. ARIENS, THE LAWYER’S CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAWYER
ETHICS (forthcoming 2022).
35. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY 1 (1994).
36. 8 LAW NOTES 321, 322–23 (Edward Thompson Co. 1904) reprinted in Federal Courts,
49 OHIO L. BULL. 467 (1904).
37. Id.
38. The Ethics of the Bench, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, June 5, 1909, at 360.
39. Id.
40. Transactions of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association Held at
Seattle, Washington, 33 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 3, 55–86 (1908).
41. Report of the Special Committee on Legal Ethics, REP. 16TH ANN. MEETING PA. B. ASS’N
156, 169–70 (1910).
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ask questions of counsel during argument, so long as the judge managed
to “avoid all appearance of bias.”42 The Special Committee’s effort was
rejected by the Association, which instead wholly adopted the ABA
Canons.43 The Pennsylvania Bar Association did invite proposals for
canons of judicial ethics, and in 1911, the Special Committee proposed
two statements relevant to appearances: First, a judge shall “guide and
guard his life that it shall furnish no just ground for suspicion of either his
impartiality or of his integrity.”44 Second, “[i]n interrogating counsel he
should avoid any appearance of bias.”45 The Association agreed to the
Special Committee’s proposals.46
That same year, two New York lawyers interested in improving the
legal profession and the administration of justice, Charles A. Boston and
Everett V. Abbot, wrote The Judiciary and the Administration of the
Law.47 The authors sent a questionnaire to lawyers and others across the
United States asking whether the public (and they, the recipients) were
satisfied with the administration of justice in their community.48 After
digesting the results (showing some satisfaction but significant
dissatisfaction), the authors concluded, “a dangerous unrest and distrust
pervade[s] the country” regarding judicial administration.49
Dissatisfaction with the judiciary was “a problem of the gravest
character.”50
One “preliminary” solution was to craft “a full and cogent statement
of the moral principles which should guide the judiciary.”51 These “canons
of judicial ethics” should declare the judge’s duty to act impartially,
efficiently, and most importantly, honorably. Honorable conduct included
the judge’s duty to be “scrupulous to free himself from all improper
influences and from all appearance of being improperly or corruptly
influenced.”52

42. Id. at 170.
43. Id. at 328–29.
44. Report of the Special Committee on Legal Ethics, REP. 17TH ANN. MEETING PA. B. ASS’N
142, 143 (1911).
45. Id. at 144.
46. Id. at 203.
47. Everett V. Abbot & Charles A. Boston, The Judiciary and the Administration of the Law,
45 AM. L. REV. 481, 507 (1911).
48. Id. at 490 (reprinting questions).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 505.
51. Id. at 506.
52. Id. at 507.

(REVISED) FINAL ARTICLE - PROFESSOR ARIENS (2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

644

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

5/17/22 5:11 PM

[Vol. 70

Charles Boston spoke at the ABA’s annual meeting in summer 1912.53
His general topic was ideal behavior in the legal profession. Near its end,
he focused on the duty of judges to meet those high ideals. Boston
reiterated most of the conclusions of his co-authored 1911 article.54 Like
several earlier proposals, Boston discussed the duty of judges to avoid the
appearance of bias in asking questions of a lawyer: “In interrogating
counsel [the judge] should avoid any appearance of bias.”55
Reform-minded lawyers remained unhappy with judicial
administration of the law, which led to the creation of the American
Judicature Society (AJS) in 1913.56 That same year, the ABA created a
Judicial Section.57 The focus of the AJS was structural reform of the
judiciary, not judicial ethics.58 The focus of the ABA’s Judicial Section
was less clear. Judges were encouraged to gather and exchange ideas, but
an ABA Section had extraordinary autonomy in choosing its goals.59 The
summaries of the Judicial Section’s annual proceedings in its first years
indicate little was attempted—and much less accomplished. In 1917, the
ABA Committee on Legal Ethics urged the Judicial Section to consider
drafting canons of judicial ethics.60 The Section ignored the suggestion.
None of the several suggestions that judges avoid the appearance or
suspicion of bias or impropriety was championed by either the AJS or the
ABA’s Judicial Section. In law magazines and journals, the topic was
largely unnoticed. The duty of a judge to avoid both bias and its
appearance was not promoted as an ethical principle until the ABA
responded to a judicial “scandal” in 1920–21.

53. Charles A. Boston, The Recent Movement toward the Realization of High Ideals in the Legal
Profession, 37 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 761 (1912).
54. See supra note 47.
55. Id. at 812.
56. A Circular Letter from Herbert Harley Concerning the Administration of Justice (Oct. 7,
1912),
https://digitalcollections.stcl.edu/digital/collection/p16035coll7/id/160/rec/1
[https://perma.cc/9YMR-U959]; Herbert Harley, The American Judicature Society; An Interpretation,
62 U. PA. L. REV. 340 (1914) (discussing reasons for creating AJS).
57. Transactions of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association Held at
Montreal, P. Q., Canada, 38 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 1, 70 (1913).
58. See generally MICHAL R. BELKNAP, TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY (1992).
59. JOHN AUSTIN MATZKO, THE BEST MEN OF THE BAR: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 53 (2019).
60. Summary of the Report of the Committee on Professional Ethics, 42 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 363,
364 (1917).
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B. The Appearance of Impropriety and the 1924 Canons of Judicial
Ethics
In fall 1919, the heavily-favored American League champion Chicago
White Sox lost the World Series to the National League’s Cincinnati Reds.
Rumors of a fix floated around, but it took nearly a year before the public
learned that a number of White Sox players had been bribed to lose. The
so-called “Black Sox Scandal” threatened the continued existence of major
league baseball.61
The solution devised by the owners of Major League Baseball teams
annoyed the ABA. Major League Baseball hired Kenesaw Mountain
Landis, a Chicago-based federal district court judge, to restore and protect
the integrity of the game.62
Landis, who called his position
“commissioner,” consented to serve only if the owners agreed he could
remain a federal judge. They did. The owners agreed to pay Landis an
annual salary of $42,500 and provide an annual expense account of
$7,500. This was in addition to his judicial salary of $7,500. As it did
with most substantive issues regarding judging, the Judicial Section
avoided discussing the propriety of Landis’s decision to serve as both
commissioner and federal judge.63
The proceedings of the Judicial Section’s 1921 annual meeting also
reported nothing, for the fourth consecutive year, about a code of judicial
ethics. The frustrated ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances voiced its exasperation.64 Its report to the members reminded
them of the Judicial Section’s lassitude. Ethics Committee Chairman,
Edward A. Harriman, also noted the Committee’s limited jurisdiction. For
example, it was prohibited from drafting a code of judicial ethics.65
The Judicial Section’s failure to confront the Landis issue was
irrelevant to the ABA’s powerful executive committee. Landis’s
compensation from Major League Baseball owners was widely reported

61. GENE CARNEY, BURYING THE BLACK SOX: HOW BASEBALL’S COVER-UP OF THE 1919
WORLD SERIES FIX ALMOST SUCCEEDED ch. 4 (2007); ELIOT ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT: THE BLACK
SOX AND THE 1919 WORLD SERIES 168–69 (1987) (1963); G. EDWARD WHITE, CREATING THE
NATIONAL PASTIME: BASEBALL TRANSFORMS ITSELF, 1903–1953, at 101 (1996); DAVID PIETRUSZA,
JUDGE AND JURY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF KENESAW MOUNTAIN LANDIS ch. 12 (1998) (discussing
whether the eight White Sox players who were banned for life from major league baseball actually
agreed to throw the World Series for money).
62. Id.
63. PIETRUSZA, supra note 61, at chs. 11, 13.
64. Report of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 46 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 302,
305 (1921).
65. Id.
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by the press; ABA leadership found it excessive and offensive. The
Executive Committee proposed the membership adopt a resolution stating,
in part, “the conduct of Kenesaw M. Landis in engaging in private
employment and accepting private emolument while holding the position
of a federal judge and receiving a salary from the federal government,
meets with our unqualified condemnation.”66 The Executive Committee
argued Landis had “ethically failed” by succumbing to the “temptations of
avarice and private gain.”67 Landis’s behavior was “undermining public
confidence in the independence of the judiciary.”68 Landis’s supporters
failed to halt the resolution’s momentum, and the members approved it.
Landis was the only person condemned by the ABA in its first halfcentury.69
On September 24, 1921, less than a month after the ABA’s
condemnation of Landis, Charles A. Boston wrote to the Executive
Committee.70 He reminded ABA leaders that the subject of judicial ethics
was ignored when the ABA crafted its 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics.
That decision was intended to blunt the “agitation for a recall of the
judiciary and for the recall of judicial decisions,”71 a threat that no longer
existed. Boston offered several examples justifying a statement of
“general principles of proper judicial conduct,” a project that would
benefit the judiciary and the public alike.72 He concluded, “the time is
now ripe for the American Bar Association to formulate and promulgate
Canons of proper judicial conduct.”73 The Executive Committee dug
around and found a 1909 resolution giving it the authority to create a

66. Transactions of the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 46
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 19, 61 (1921) (stating resolution); see also PIETRUSZA, supra note 61, at ch. 13
(discussing events).
67. Transactions of the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 46
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 19, 61 (1921).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 62–67.
70. Letter from Charles A. Boston to the A.B.A. Executive Committee (Sept. 24, 1921) in
WILLIAM
H.
TAFT
PAPERS:
SERIES
3,
SEPT.
24–OCT.
20,
1921,
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234-234_0020_1185/?sp=8 [https://perma.cc/RHE663JD] [hereinafter Boston Letter]; see also John P. MacKenzie, The Appearance of Justice 182–83
(1974) (noting letter).
71. Boston Letter, supra note 70, at 1; see also Edward J. Schoenbaum, A Historical Look at
Judicial Discipline, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 8 (1977) (noting adoption of judicial recall in Oregon in
1908, California in 1911, and Arizona, Colorado, and Nevada in 1912); MATZKO, supra note 59, at
221–25 (discussing ABA worry regarding judicial recall); ROSS, supra note 35, at chs. 5, 6 (noting
judicial recall and judicial referendum efforts).
72. Boston Letter, supra note 70, at 3.
73. Id.
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committee to work on canons of judicial ethics.74 In early 1922, the
committee was formed.75 It consisted of five members: three judges and
two practicing lawyers. Former President William Howard Taft, who had
been confirmed as Chief Justice in mid-1921, was named the committee’s
chairman.76 Charles Boston was appointed secretary and served as the
principal drafter of the canons. After a May 1922 meeting, Boston drafted
an initial version of “proposed Canons of Judicial Ethics.”77
The first draft did not number the proposed canons. However, the
fourth-listed canon was titled: Avoidance of Suspicion of Impropriety.78 It
immediately followed a canon enjoining judges to “abstain . . . from all
acts of oppression and unfairness.”79 The fourth Canon began, “[b]ut
beyond this,” the judge “should alike be free from the suspicion of
impropriety.”80 Another proposed canon, Business Promotions and
Solicitations for Charity, concluded a judge should avoid both improper
conduct and the suspicion of improper conduct in order not “to create the
impression” that the judge’s marketing efforts affected or interfered with
the judge’s official duties.81 A third proposed canon, Habitual
Improprieties, noted they were also to be avoided.82 Avoiding such bad
habits included the duty of a judge to “avoid the appearance of doing any
thing [sic] which would naturally or reasonably incite the reflection that
he has formed [improper] habits.”83 Other proposed canons urged judges
to avoid suspicions of bias or impropriety.84
In August 1922, Leslie Cornish, a member of the Committee and the
Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sent the other members
a redraft of Boston’s initial efforts. He retained the proposed Avoidance
74. Transactions of the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 34
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 3, 88 (1909).
75. Special Committees 1922–1923, 47 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 159, 160 (1922).
76. Id.
77. Letter from Charles A. Boston to Members of the Committee on Judicial Ethics (June 5,
1922) in WILLIAM H. TAFT PAPERS: SERIES 3, MAY 14–JUNE 13, 1922; COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL
ETHICS, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1922), https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234242_0020_1170/?sp=1037&r=-0.516,0.044,2.031,0.984,0 [https://perma.cc/GV9T-DCD5].
78. COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS, supra note 77, at 2.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 7–8.
82. Id. at 10.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 11–12 (avoid relationships that “normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such
relations warp or bias his judgment”); id. at 12 (“avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken
the suspicion that his social or business relations” may affect his judicial determinations); id. at 22–23
(accepting a retainer after retirement may “create the suspicion that his decision was influenced by his
expectation” of a retainer after retirement).
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of Suspicion of Impropriety Canon.85 After a late 1922 committee
meeting, a revised and printed January 1923 draft numbered the proposed
Canons. Canon 5 was retitled: Avoidance of Appearance of Impropriety.
The text of proposed Canon 5 was rephrased from the original, but its
substance and thrust remained constant: “A judge’s official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety.”86 Why Boston or the
Committee substituted the anodyne “appearance” for “suspicion” is
unknown.
Taft made several editorial changes to this draft, though none to
proposed Canon 5. As edited, it was published in the February 1923 issue
of the American Bar Association Journal for comment.87 The Committee
incorporated a few of the many suggested proposals. The Committee’s
final report was published in the July issue of the ABA Journal.88 The
Canon urging judges to avoid an appearance of impropriety returned to the
fourth-listed Canon. Canon 4 was broadened to read: “A judge’s official
conduct should be free from impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety.”89
The goals of the Committee on Judicial Ethics were declared in its
Preamble to the February 1923 proposed Canons: They represented the
ABA’s view regarding “those principles which should govern the personal
practice of members of the judiciary in the administration of their office.”90
Relatedly, the Canons were designed to impress upon judges the duty to
use those principles “as a proper guide and reminder . . . indicating what
the people have a right to expect from them.”91 Taft’s introductory letter
provided even clearer insight into the Ethics Committee’s goals: Though
some critics contended the Canons would be “inefficacious without a
sanction,” the Committee concluded the Code was “not intended to have

85. Leslie C. Cornish, Tentative Redraft, Canons of Judicial Ethics (September 1922) in
WILLIAM
H.
TAFT
PAPERS:
SERIES
3,
AUG.
9–OCT.
1,
1922,
at
2,
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234-245_0020_1180/?sp=9 [https://perma.cc/PU58S9CP].
86. Report and Proposed Canons of Judicial Ethics (galley proof) (January 1923) in WILLIAM
H. TAFT PAPERS: SERIES 3, DEC. 3–28, 1922, at 5, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234248_0020_1197/?sp=698 [https://perma.cc/LE2E-TETU].
87. The Proposed Canons of Judicial Ethics, 9 A.B.A. J. 71, 73–76 (1923) [hereinafter Proposed
Canons].
88. Final Report and Proposed Canons of Judicial Ethics, 9 A.B.A. J. 449 (1923) [hereinafter
1923 Final Report]; it was subsequently printed in Final Report of the Committee on Judicial Ethics
Committee Report, 48 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 452, 454 (1923).
89. 1923 Final Report, supra note 88, at 450.
90. Proposed Canons, supra note 87, at 73 (Preamble).
91. 1923 Final Report, supra note 88, at 450.
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the force of law.”92 The proposed Canons were to enlighten judges by
guiding them to act, and appear to act, in a responsible, honorable
manner.93
The Committee’s proposal that the ABA adopt the Canons of Judicial
Ethics was not acted on at the ABA’s annual meeting in Minneapolis. By
waiting until its next Annual Meeting in 1924, the ABA gave the
heretofore uninterested Judicial Section an opportunity to voice its
opinion.94 When it finally roused itself to act, the Judicial Section made
just one recommendation: Amend Canon 13. Titled Kinship or Influence,
it stated in part, “if such a course can reasonably be avoided, [the judge]
should not sit in litigation where a near relative appears before him as
counsel.”95 This appeared a modest extension of several rules created in
the nineteenth century, as discussed above. First, a judge was not
permitted to hear a case when one of the parties was related to the judge.
Second, a judge lacked the legal authority to hear a case when he
previously represented a party in the case. Third, in New York, a judge’s
law partner was not permitted to practice in the judge’s court.96 All three
were designed to avoid both impropriety and its appearance. Canon 13
was premised on the same policy.
Boston’s initial 1922 draft included a variation of what became
proposed Canon 13. It cautioned judges against hearing cases “in which a
near relative appears as counsel, or as a party.”97 That language was left
unchanged by Cornish and Taft. More broadly, Boston included language
in Canon 13 that the court should not give the impression that any lawyer
was “dominant over” the judge.98 As amended for clarity, it remained in
the proposed final draft.
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice Arthur P. Rugg
spoke to Taft of his court’s disapproval of proposed Canon 13 at a meeting

92. Id. at 449.
93. Boston had made the same arguments regarding the goals of a statement of ethical behavior
as an outside commentator on the Canons of Professional Ethics. See Charles A. Boston, A Code of
Legal Ethics, 20 GREEN BAG 221, 224 (1908).
94. Transactions of the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 48 A.B.A.
ANN. REP. 73, 74–76 (1923).
95. 1923 Final Report, supra note 88, at 450.
96. See text accompanying notes 13–33.
97. Canons of Judicial Ethics, Kinship of Parties and Counsel: Influence of Attorneys (June
1923) in WILLIAM H. TAFT PAPERS: SERIES 3, MAY 14–JUNE 13, 1922, at 11,
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234242_0020_1170/?sp=1044&r=0.001,0.003,1.052,0.51,0 [https://perma.cc/5WQW-UT5C].
98. Id.
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of the new American Law Institute.99 He followed up with a letter to Taft.
Rugg noted six judges on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court—
including Rugg himself—violated proposed Canon 13’s prohibition
against judges hearing and deciding cases in which a near relative (usually
son or brother) was acting as counsel.100 Rugg informed Taft no justice of
that court had ever recused himself in such a case because they did not
believe doing so was necessary to maintain the court’s integrity. He also
noted that none had written the court’s opinion when a relative represented
a client before the Supreme Judicial Court. Taft agreed; this was not an
issue of unethical behavior. He wrote Boston and other committee
members of his “great deal of doubt” regarding proposed Canon 13. As
he wrote in a letter to Rugg (a copy of which he attached to a letter sent to
committee members), it seemed unnecessary because it focused on “a few
abuses.”101 Boston alone disagreed.102
Taft scheduled a meeting of the Committee immediately before the
ABA’s 1924 Annual Meeting to iron out the issue of Canon 13.103 Illness
left Taft unable to travel and attend the meeting. A committee of the
Judicial Section met in Boston’s room joined by two Judicial Ethics
Committee members: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice Robert
von Moschzisker and Cornish. As von Moschzisker wrote Taft recounting
the meeting: “Our friend Boston died a little hard, but die he did, and we
99. Letter from Arthur P. Rugg to William Howard Taft (May 8, 1924), in WILLIAM H. TAFT
PAPERS: SERIES 3, APR. 18–MAY 18, 1924, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234264_0020_1135/?sp=769 [https://perma.cc/5ANB-P23X]; see also MacKenzie, supra note 70, at 186–
87.
100. Letter from Arthur P. Rugg to William Howard Taft (May 8, 1924), in WILLIAM H. TAFT
PAPERS: SERIES 3, APR. 18–MAY 18, 1924, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234264_0020_1135/?sp=769 [https://perma.cc/5ANB-P23X].
101. Letter from William Howard Taft to Charles A. Boston (May 12, 1924), in WILLIAM H.
TAFT PAPERS: SERIES 3, APR. 18–MAY 18, 1924, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234264_0020_1135/?sp=849&r=-0.348,0.201,1.542,0.747,0 [https://perma.cc/WD5L-QFK9]; Letter
from William Howard Taft to Arthur Rugg (May 12, 1924), in WILLIAM H. TAFT PAPERS: SERIES 3,
APR.
18–MAY
18,
1924,
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234264_0020_1135/?sp=880&r=-0.343,0.195,1.84,0.891,0 [https://perma.cc/HNB8-G2TX].
102. Letter from Charles A. Boston to William Howard Taft (May 12, 1924), in WILLIAM H. TAFT
PAPERS: SERIES 3, APR. 18–MAY 18, 1924, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234264_0020_1135/?sp=932 [https://perma.cc/WD5L-QFK9]; Letter from Leslie Cornish to William
Howard Taft (May 12, 1924), in WILLIAM H. TAFT PAPERS: SERIES 3, APR. 18–MAY 18, 1924,
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234-264_0020_1135/?sp=937&r=0.475,0.082,1.684,0.816,0 [https://perma.cc/2VMY-CM2Q]; Letter from Robert von Moschzisker to
William Howard Taft (May 13, 1924), in WILLIAM H. TAFT PAPERS: SERIES 3, APR. 18–MAY 18,
1924,
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234-264_0020_1135/?sp=916&r=0.374,0.12,1.965,0.952,0 [https://perma.cc/HG2A-7BL4].
103. Letter from William Howard Taft to Charles A. Boston (May 16, 1924), in WILLIAM H. TAFT
PAPERS: SERIES 3, APR. 18–MAY 18, 1924, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234264_0020_1135/?sp=1027&r=-0.447,0.211,1.856,0.899,0 [https://perma.cc/26KL-WK6B].
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have eliminated the part that you thought should go out.”104 Cornish and
von Moschzisker asked Boston to speak regarding the newly-edited
proposed Canons in Taft’s absence. Boston eventually agreed. Boston’s
address included explaining the Committee’s acquiescence to Rugg’s and
the Judicial Section’s amendment.
Boston told ABA members that the Committee had learned state
courts disagreed on the propriety of a judge sitting in a case when a near
relative served as counsel.105 Although there existed a “reprehensible”
practice of some trial judges hearing cases in such a situation, it was “not
widespread.”106 Thus, Boston concluded, the suggested amendment to
Canon 13 “does not call for very much difference of opinion.”107 Even as
amended, Boston said, Canon 13 denounced the practice without using
“the particular words.”108 The first sentence of Canon 13 was rephrased
to inform the judge he should not act when a near relative was a party.
This rule was largely accepted by states. The text— related to avoiding
sitting in a case in which a near relative was counsel—was deleted.
Finally, Canon 13 declared, the judge “should not suffer his conduct to
justify the impression that any person can improperly influence him or
unduly enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank, position
or influence of any party or other person.”109 If read very closely, “other
person” included counsel as well as witnesses and members of the jury.
The ABA adopted the Canons of Judicial Ethics, including amended
Canon 13, in their entirety.110
The Canons of Judicial Ethics existed to educate judges, not chastise
them. In Boston’s view, judges were akin to military officers, whose
behavior was judged based on a standard of honor. A judge should view
his “position as honorable of itself and honorably to be maintained.”111
What the Canons offered was the opportunity for judges with spotless
reputations to avoid unwittingly engaging in conduct which created an
appearance of impropriety, such as fundraising for a charitable
104. Letter from Robert von Moschzisker to William Howard Taft (July 10, 1924), in WILLIAM
H.
TAFT
PAPERS:
SERIES
3,
JUNE
18–AUG.
11,
1924,
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234-266_0020_1209/?sp=478&r=0.345,0.289,1.774,0.859,0 [https://perma.cc/Y9QL-52QG].
105. Transactions of the Forty-Seventh Meeting of the American Bar Association, 49 A.B.A.
ANN. REP. 65, 65–71 (1924).
106. Id. at 66.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 66–67.
109. Id. at 67.
110. Id. at 71.
111. Abbot & Boston, supra note 47, at 507.
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organization. This was Boston’s example in his 1921 letter urging the
ABA to form a committee to formulate judicial ethics canons.112 Both the
final Canon of Judicial Ethics (Canon 34) and the last Canon of
Professional Ethics (Canon 32) provided a summary of proper
professional behavior. For a judge, this meant acting “above reproach.”113
C. Fits and Starts: The Slow Development of the Appearance of
Impropriety
“The Judicial Canons had little immediate impact.”114 Georgia
adopted the Canons in 1925; the State Bar of California followed suit in
1928.115 A year later, the California Bar learned it lacked the authority to
do so. By late 1937, only three bar associations had adopted the Canons.
By 1945, eleven had done so.116
More particularly, the appearance of impropriety standard was rarely
raised to challenge a judge’s behavior. The Canons were neither
statements of law nor statements of judicial discipline in any state. A
judge could be disqualified from a case for failing to avoid an appearance
of impropriety only if a state created such a standard by law or
constitutional measure. Such occasions were rare.
One notable instance of the use of the appearance standard was a 1933
New Mexico Supreme Court case, Tharp v. Massengill.117 Tharp raised
the kinship issue that was the subject of Canon 13. Tharp successfully
sued Massengill for breach of contract. Tharp alleged he and Massengill
created a joint venture to purchase real property as equal partners. Tharp
found the properties and Massengill financed their purchase. Tharp
alleged Massengill secretly purchased real property that Tharp found for
the joint venture. On appeal, Massengill claimed the trial judge, Harry
Patton, should have been disqualified because his son, Perkins, was one of
Tharp’s lawyers, and Perkins was compensated on a contingent fee
basis.118
This, Massengill contended, violated the New Mexico
112. Letter from Charles Boston to ABA Exec. Comm. (Sept. 24, 1921), in WILLIAM H. TAFT
PAPERS: SERIES 3, SEPT. 24–OCT. 20, 1921, at 3, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss42234.mss42234234_0020_1185/?sp=9&r=-0.487,-0.08,1.498,0.725,0 [https://perma.cc/DQG9-U3ML].
113. Transactions of the Forty-Seventh Meeting of the American Bar Association, 49 A.B.A. ANN.
REP. 760, 769 (1924).
114. Susan A. Henderson, The Origin and Adoption of the American Bar Association’s Canons
of Judicial Ethics, 52 JUDICATURE 387, 387 (1969).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 387–88.
117. 28 P.2d 502 (N.M. 1933).
118. Id. at 504–05.
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Constitution, which forbade a judge from presiding in a case in which a
relative was a party.119
Massengill argued Perkins’s contingent
compensation effectively made him a party.120 The New Mexico Supreme
Court agreed, though only after noting “a maze of divergent views” caused
it to “become lost in a labyrinth of authorities and sink in a quandary of
doubt as to the correct rule to be laid down.”121 After evaluating these
divergent views, the New Mexico Supreme Court sided with those states
which broadly interpreted “parties” to include anyone with a pecuniary
interest in the case.122 It did so, in part, to “give full force and effect to the
high ideals of an impartial and unbiased judiciary.”123 The goals of the
constitutional prohibition were, in order, giving litigants “a fair and
impartial trial by an impartial and unbiased tribunal,” and ensuring
judgment was rendered “in such manner as will beget no suspicion of the
fairness or integrity of the judge.”124 The court quoted its decision from
two months earlier, which in turn approvingly quoted Canon 4: “[A]
judge’s official conduct should be free from impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety.”125
As made clear in Tharp, lawyers looked for legal relief in the state’s
constitution and then in any statutory prohibitions. They did not refer to
the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Even so, the Canons found increasing favor
in the American legal profession during the quarter-century between the
end of World War II in 1945 and the late 1960s. Approximately thirty
additional state bar associations or courts adopted the Canons of Judicial
Ethics during that period.126 The most important aspect of the Canons
remained their educative value. A few courts either adopted or positively
referred to the Canons in disqualification proceedings.127 They were not,
however, used to impose discipline on judges. As for the appearance of
impropriety standard found in the Canons, its use was exceedingly modest
119. Id. at 506.
120. Id. (quoting N.M. Const. Art. 6 § 18):
No judge of any court nor justice of the peace shall, except by consent of all parties, sit in
the trial of any cause in which either of the parties shall be related to him by affinity or
consanguinity within the degree of first cousin, or in which he was counsel, or in the trial
of which he presided in any inferior court, or in which he has an interest.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 506–09.
123. Id. at 509.
124. Id. at 508.
125. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Hanna v. Armijo, 28 P.2d 511, 512–13 (N.M. 1933)).
126. Henderson, supra note 114, at 388; see generally Robert J. Martineau, Enforcement of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410, 411 (noting various ways in which states
“adopted” the Canons).
127. See, e.g., Franks v. Franks, 150 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Neb. 1967).
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during this period.128
One example of this modesty is In re Filipiak, a 1953 decision of the
Supreme Court of Indiana.129 Filipiak was a juvenile court judge. The
Indiana Disciplinary Commission charged him with acting corruptly and
dishonestly in his judicial capacity and asked the court to disbar him. In
an opaque opinion, the court held the charges were not proved. The facts
were found only in the concurring and dissenting opinions.130
The concurring opinion begins with some detail: Filipiak “was
charged, in substance, with having entered into a conspiracy with Blaz A.
Lucas and Bryan Narcowich, attorneys of this bar and state, to free one
Joseph Kaczka from serving a sentence in the Indiana State Farm for six
months, for a financial consideration in the sum of $600.”131 On April 6,
1950, Kaczka was sentenced by Filipiak to six months at the Indiana State
Farm for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Fifteen days later,
Blaz Lucas, another prosecutor in the office that prosecuted Kaczka, and
who claimed to represent Kaczka,132 called Filipiak to request a new trial
for Kaczka.133 Based on the judicial minutes Filipiak himself wrote, he
immediately granted the motion over the phone.134 When Kaczka came
before him a week later for the formal hearing on this motion, Filipiak
suspended Kaczka’s six-month sentence and accompanying fine, contrary
to Indiana law. The prosecutor’s office was not represented at the hearing.
The evidence showed that Filipiak received none of the $600 paid to the
lawyers as alleged by the Disciplinary Commission.
The concurring opinion found Filipiak’s “judicial conduct falls very
short of the proper standards laid down by the Canons of Judicial Ethics.”
It found applicable Canon 4, avoiding the appearance of impropriety, and
Canon 17, which cautioned against private efforts to influence the judge’s
actions.135 But violating those unenforceable standards did not subject
Filipiak to disbarment, merely derision:
What was proved was judicial stupidity of a high order. When a judge in
a criminal matter acts without jurisdiction to set aside a judgment of
imprisonment and then enters a suspended sentence he invites suspicion
128. Id.
129. 113 N.E.2d 282 (Ind. 1953).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 283 (Emmert, J., concurring).
132. The concurring opinion indicates it was Kaczka himself who told Lucas his role as a
prosecutor disqualified him from representing Kaczka. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 284–85.
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that he has acted corruptly. There were violations of some of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association, and because these
canons were violated it is proper to note them by an opinion.136

Courts applied the appearance of impropriety standard to two types of
instances between 1953 and 1972. First, and most often, the standard was
used to determine whether the judge’s actions at trial created such
unfairness as to reverse the judgment.137 Second, the standard was applied
to decide whether particular judicial misconduct was subject to some
disciplinary sanction.138 Most opinions made conclusory statements
regarding why the appearance of impropriety standard was applicable;
none relied solely on that standard to discipline a judge.
Both the broad issue of judicial ethics and the narrower appearance of
impropriety standard were increasingly topics of debate and concern in the
late 1960s. The ABA responded by revising its Canons of Judicial Ethics
for the first time in half a century. States responded by initiating
disciplinary cases against judges who engaged in misconduct. This
transformation continued into the modern era of judicial ethics.
III. MODERN JUDICIAL ETHICS
A. Introduction
Lame-duck President Lyndon Baines Johnson nominated Associate
Justice Abe Fortas to the position of Chief Justice in June 1968.139 This
ended disastrously for both men. After Fortas was confirmed to the
136. Id. at 283.
137. State v. Lawrence, 123 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ohio 1954) (Lamneck, J., concurring) (“A judge’s
official actions upon the bench should be free from impropriety or the appearance of impropriety.”);
Franks v. Franks, 150 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Neb. 1967):
The Canons of Judicial Ethics provide, in essence, that a judge should be impartial, that his
official conduct should be free from even the appearance of impropriety, and that his undue
interference in a trial may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause and the
ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.
138. Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279, 281–82, 284 (7th Cir. 1972) (accepting Illinois Courts
Commission’s removal of judge based on statements made after receiving transactional immunity
from prosecution and referencing Canon 4 and its applicability to both professional and personal
actions); Matter of Schweitzer, 409 N.Y.S.2d 964, 970 (N.Y. Ct. Jud. 1971) (noting judge violated
Canon 4, among other Canons of Judicial Ethics); In re Greenberg, 280 A.2d 370, 372 (Pa. 1971)
(referring briefly to Canon 4); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Heitzler, 291 N.E.2d 477, 482, 484 (Ohio
1972) (agreeing judge’s personal behavior was not “above reproach” and in violation of Canon 4);
Matter of DeSaulnier, 279 N.E.2d 296, 309–10 (Mass. 1972) (holding possession of real estate
broker’s license violates appearance of impropriety standard of Canon 4); In re Robson, 500 P.2d 657,
660 n.7 (Alaska 1972) (listing violation of Canon 4 and other Canons).
139. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 328 (1990).

(REVISED) FINAL ARTICLE - PROFESSOR ARIENS (2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

656

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

5/17/22 5:11 PM

[Vol. 70

Supreme Court in 1965, he agreed to serve as a consultant to a family
foundation of a former client, Louis Wolfson.140 In his ill-defined role as
consultant, Fortas was to be paid $20,000 annually for life.141 This sum
would be paid to his widow after his death.142 The pay of a Supreme Court
Justice was $39,500,143 significantly less than Fortas earned in the private
practice of law.144 In December 1966, Fortas returned the first payment
from the Foundation, which he’d received in January.145 Fortas’s return
occurred after Wolfson was indicted.146 Though the Wolfson consultancy
did not violate any federal law, it was unseemly for a Justice of the
Supreme Court to appear to be doing work for a private entity. Wolfson’s
indictment made Fortas’s arrangement with the Wolfson Foundation
politically untenable.
In 1967, American University agreed to pay Fortas $15,000 to teach a
summer course in its law school.147 This was an eye-opening amount. The
$15,000 was raised by Paul Porter, Fortas’s former partner, from outside
donors—largely former clients and friends of Fortas.148 The news of
Fortas’s summer course pay became public shortly after Johnson
nominated Fortas for Chief Justice. Though no evidence existed that
Fortas was aware of the donors’ identity, its disclosure helped quash his
nomination.149
Fortas’s nomination as Chief Justice was withdrawn in fall 1968; in
May 1969, he resigned from the Court after his ethical conduct was
questioned in a story in the mass-market Life magazine.150 The story
disclosed the consulting arrangement between Fortas and the Wolfson
Family Foundation, and it raised the issue whether Fortas had created an
appearance of impropriety, in part due to the amount Fortas was to receive
annually.151 Less than a week after his resignation, the ABA’s Standing
Committee on Professional Ethics issued its second Formal Opinion in

140. ROBERT SHOGAN, A QUESTION OF JUDGMENT 192–96 (1972).
141. Id. at 195.
142. Id.
143. Pub. L. 88-426, 78 Stat. 400, 434 § 403(a) (Aug. 14, 1964) (increasing salary of associate
justice to $39,500 from $35,000).
144. SHOGAN, supra note 140, at 192.
145. KALMAN, supra note 139, at 325.
146. SHOGAN, supra note 140, at 209.
147. Id. at 178–79.
148. KALMAN, supra note 139, at 326.
149. SHOGAN, supra note 140, at 178–81, 192–212.
150. William Lambert, Fortas of the Supreme Court: A Question of Ethics, The Justice . . . and
the Stock Manipulator, LIFE, May 9, 1969, at 32.
151. Id. at 35 (suggesting possible “impropriety” in Wolfson-Fortas relationship).
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nine months.152 It did not name Fortas but was clearly directed at him.
The Committee declared, in all capital letters:
ALL JUDGES, OF THE LOWEST AS WELL AS THE HIGHEST
COURTS, MUST IN ALL THEIR PERSONAL BUSINESS AND
SOCIAL INTERCOURSE ACT NOT ONLY IN A MANNER THAT
IS LAWFUL AND PROPER BUT ONE WHICH GIVES THE
IMPRESSION AND APPEARANCE TO THE PUBLIC THAT IT IS
PROPER. APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IS TO BE
DETERMINED FROM ALL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND
WILL VARY DEPENDING ON ALL FACTS, INCLUDING
MATTERS BEYOND THE JUDGE’S CONTROL. A JUDGE MUST
ORDER HIS LIFE SO AS TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY.153

In August 1969, President Richard Nixon nominated Federal Court of
Appeals Judge Clement Haynsworth to the seat vacated by Fortas.154
Haynsworth was opposed by both civil rights organizations and labor
unions.155 Some senators eventually were willing to oppose his
nomination on substantive grounds, but Haynsworth’s opponents also
offered arguments of ethical lapses.156 The alleged ethical lapses were that
Haynsworth, like Fortas, had created an appearance of impropriety. The
charge alleged two instances in which Haynsworth had failed to recuse
himself from matters in which he had a financial interest. In 1963,
Haynsworth had voted in favor of a corporation (and against a union). He
did not own any of its stock but did own a significant amount of stock in
a company that regularly engaged in transactions with the partycorporation.157 After an anonymous complaint was made that Haynsworth
may have been bribed in relation to the case, he requested an investigation
and was cleared of any impropriety.158 The second instance was from late
1967. Haynsworth purchased stock in Brunswick Corporation after a
unanimous three-member court decided a case in its favor.159 Haynsworth
152. ABA Formal Op. 322 (May 18, 1969), Opinions of the ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics, 55 A.B.A. J. 666, 666 (1969).
153. Id.
154. JOHN P. FRANK, CLEMENT HAYNSWORTH, THE SENATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 26
(1991).
155. Edward N. Beiser, The Haynsworth Affair Reconsidered: The Significance of Conflicting
Perceptions of the Judicial Role, 23 VAND. L. REV. 263, 264 (1970).
156. Id. at 270–72.
157. FRANK, supra note 154, at 21–22, 32; see also Stephen L. Wasby & Joel B. Grossman, Judge
Clement E. Haynsworth, Jr.: New Perspective on His Nomination to the Supreme Court, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 74, 79–80 (1990) (discussing investigation and its conclusion).
158. Id. at 79–80.
159. FRANK, supra note 154, at 45.
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did not write an opinion. The purchase occurred after the court informally
decided the case and before its decision was publicly released.160
In late September 1969, published reports noted Haynsworth had
years earlier invested with the disgraced (and by then imprisoned)
Washington “fixer” Bobby Baker.161 No rule of judicial ethics was
violated. But some argued the mere association with Baker stained
Haynsworth’s reputation such that he should not be confirmed. He wasn’t.
The Fortas case spurred the ABA to create a special committee to update
the 1924 Canons, and the revelations regarding Haynsworth made it
imperative that the Committee work as quickly as possible.
B. The Creation of Judicial Conduct Commissions
Nearly all states constitutionally permitted the removal of judges from
office by impeachment in the state legislature. Some allowed removal by
legislative address, and—as briefly discussed above—several states
allowed removal of judges by a vote of the people, known as judicial
recall. As noted irregularly in legal journals, states rarely removed judges
from office through any of these methods, even when it was clear the judge
was no longer able or fit to serve.162
In a 1960 American Bar Association Journal article, the author listed
six states that had created another tool to remove or discipline judges.163
None had accomplished much. Likely due to publishing deadlines, the
author did not note California’s constitutional amendment that year. The
amendment, which ushered in a new approach soon copied by most states,
created a commission on judicial qualifications, more broadly known as a
160. Id.
161. Bruce H. Kalk, The Making of “Mr. Justice Haynsworth”? The Rise, Fall, and Revival of
Judge Clement F. Haynsworth Jr., 117 S.C. HIST. MAG., Jan. 2016, at 4, 21; FRANK, supra note 154,
at 64 (“Haynsworth and Baker had participated in a cemetery investment in 1958 without either
knowing that the other was involved, but the name association was enough.”).
162. Burke Shartel, Retirement and Removal of Judges, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 133, 151
n.86 (1936) (listing five cases in which state judges were removed from office between 1900-1925);
Frederic M. Miller, Discipline of Judges, 50 MICH. L. REV. 737, 737 (1952) (noting three unsuccessful
impeachments of state judges between 1928-1948); George E. Brand, The Discipline of Judges, 46
A.B.A. J. 1315, 1315 n.2 (1960) (noting 1960 survey to which forty states replied listed just seventeen
states ever using impeachment, in a total of fifty-two cases, with nineteen removals, three resignations,
and one unknown outcome); WILLIAM THOMAS BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? A STUDY
OF PROCEDURES FOR REMOVAL AND RETIREMENT 12–13 (1971) (describing the infrequent use of
impeachment, address, and recall as systems to remove judges) [hereinafter WHO JUDGES]; William
T. Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct and the Evolution of the Illinois Courts Commission 1964-1970,
1969 U. ILL. L.F. 442, 444 (listing five states using impeachment between 1954-1969).
163. Brand, supra note 162, at 1316–17 (listing New York, Virginia, Utah, Ohio, Wisconsin, and
Michigan).
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judicial conduct organization.164 Its initial authority was limited to
recommending to the California Supreme Court the removal or retirement
of judges in the state.165 The California Commission was quite active. In
its first four years, it “directly” caused the retirement or resignation of
twenty-six judges, and several more were “indirectly” caused to leave the
bench.166 Its official recommendations were much more slowly accepted
by the California Supreme Court.167 A commission recommendation to
censure a judge was first adopted by the California Supreme Court in
1970.168 Three years later, that court first adopted a Commission
recommendation to remove a judge.169
From the mid-1960s through 1971, one-third of the states created
judicial conduct commissions; by 1981, the District of Columbia and every
state had created or agreed to create a judicial conduct organization.170
Some states gave judicial conduct organizations relatively narrow powers,
as in California’s case. Others gave them broader powers, including the
power to impose, not merely recommend, judicial discipline, such as
Wisconsin.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopted a Code of Judicial Ethics
applicable to all state judges effective January 1, 1968.171 Four years later,
it created a judicial commission to implement the Code. Unlike the initial
grant of authority in California, the Wisconsin Judicial Commission could
“reprimand or censure a judge.”172 Also unlike in California, Wisconsin
judges could be suspended or removed from office only through the
164. Jack E. Frankel, Removal of Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem, 49 A.B.A. J. 166,
166 (1963); Louis H. Burke, Judicial Discipline and Removal: The California Story, 46 J. AM. JUD.
SOC’Y 167, 168 (1965); Schoenbaum, supra note 71, at 20.
165. Schoenbaum, supra note 71, at 20.
166. Burke, supra note 164, at 170.
167. See BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES, supra note 162, at 90–93 (discussing early years of
California Commission).
168. In re Chargin, 471 P.2d 29, 29 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (per curiam).
169. Geiler v. Comm’n on Jud. Qualifications, 515 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1973).
170. See James J. Alfini, Shailey Gupta-Brietzke & James F. McMartin IV, Dealing with Judicial
Misconduct in the States: Judicial Independence, Accountability and Reform, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 889,
891–92 nn.6–8 (2007). Arkansas created a commission by statute in 1977, Schoenbaum, supra note
71, at 24–27, and did the same by constitutional amendment in 1988, see JUD. DISCIPLINE &
DISABILITY COMM’N, About the Commission, https://www.jddc.arkansas.gov/about-the-commission/
[https://perma.cc/FE6A-XNQ7] (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).
171. In re Code of Jud. Ethics, 153 N.W.2d 873, 874 (Wis. 1967).
172. In re Promulgation of Code of Jud. Ethics, 191 N.W.2d 923, 924 (Wis. 1971); see generally
Lisa L. Lewis, Judicial Discipline, Removal, and Retirement, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 563. The current
Judicial Commission has no power to adjudicate cases of judicial discipline. See ST. OF WIS., JUD.
COMM’N:
ANN.
REP.
1
(2020),
https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/committees/judicialcommission/annualreport2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Y3N-TU6N].
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constitutionally-permitted measures of impeachment, address, and recall.
A 1969 judicial scandal involving two members of the Illinois
Supreme Court may have generated increased support for the creation of
judicial conduct commissions among the states.173 In 1962, the Illinois
Constitution was amended to permit a “commission” consisting of five
judges to remove, retire, or suspend judges for cause. The commission
was to act based on procedural rules adopted by the Illinois Supreme
Court. Two years later, the court completed its rule making, and the
Illinois Courts Commission was formed.174 It then did nothing.
The Illinois Supreme Court decided the Commission could “convene”
only when the court commanded it to do so.175 And it didn’t do so until
mid-1967, over three years after its creation.176 The subject of this meeting
was a judge whose unusual bonding practices generated both puzzlement
and concern among fellow Cook County (Chicago) judges.177 Before the
Commission could act, the judge resigned. The judge eventually pled
guilty to fifteen counts of official misconduct, a lesser crime than the
original bribery charges.178 Similar charges against a second Cook County
judge were dismissed by the Commission.179
The limited authority of the Commission frustrated bar leaders. A
joint effort of the Chicago and Illinois State Bar Associations worked to
restructure its authority, including giving it limited independence from the
Illinois Supreme Court. They succeeded in doing so just as two supreme
court justices were accused of “undue influence and appearance of
impropriety” in affirming dismissal of criminal charges against a lawyer
named Theodore Isaacs.180 The allegation was the two justices, Associate
Justice Ray Klingbeil and Chief Justice Roy Solfisburg, had received stock
of a privately-held bank—the Civil Center Bank and Trust Company
where Isaacs served as general counsel—during the pendency of the

173. See generally REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM’N OF THE SUPREME CT. OF ILL. NO. 39797 (1969),
https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/manaster/commissionreport.html [https://perma.cc/T4WT-HMUT].
174. See Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct, supra note 162, at 452–58 (describing history of
Commission).
175. Id. at 453.
176. Id. at 454.
177. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES, supra note 162, at 102–03.
178. KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE: THE SCANDAL OF 1969 AND THE RISE OF JOHN
PAUL STEVENS 245 (2001).
179. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES, supra note 162, at 103–05.
180. REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM’N OF THE SUPREME CT. OF ILL., supra note 173, ¶ 25; see
generally MANASTER, supra note 178 (Manaster served as associate counsel to the Special
Commission); see also BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN
INDEPENDENT LIFE 141–44 (2010).
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appeal in Isaacs’s case.181
Giving the restructured Illinois Courts Commission the opportunity to
investigate Klingbeil and Solfisburg was problematic, not only because
Klingbeil was a member of the Commission, but also because the
Commission had not proven itself capable of doing the necessary work.
The remaining members of the supreme court created a Special
Commission to investigate, to which it appointed two of its five members,
the presidents of the Chicago and Illinois State Bar Associations.182
The Special Commission named lawyer (and future Supreme Court
Justice) John Paul Stevens as its general counsel. Over the next seven
weeks, the Commission examined twenty-one witnesses and gathered
other evidence. In its findings and conclusions, the Special Commission
favorably quoted ABA Formal Opinion 322.183 Like the unnamed Fortas,
Solfisburg and Klingbiel had created an appearance of impropriety by
obtaining (either by gift or by payment) stock in a company partly owned
and operated by a party in a pending case.184 The Special Commission
decided both Solfisburg and Klingbiel had violated Canon 4, the
appearance of impropriety, and had also committed “certain positive acts
of impropriety.”185
C. The Appearance of Impropriety and the 1972 Code of Judicial
Conduct
1. The 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct
In August 1969, newly-elected ABA President Bernard Segal created
a Special Committee to “reformulat[e]” the 1924 Canons.186 Segal
suggested this reformulation was long overdue, and his decision was
largely independent of the “unfortunate, highly publicized events of recent
months.”187 He also noted Chief Justice Warren Burger’s approval of an

181. MANASTER, supra note 178, at 13–15, 119–22, 128–30, 143–47.
182. Those two individually each picked an additional member, and jointly chose the fifth
member. REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM’N OF THE SUPREME CT. OF ILL., supra note 173, ¶ 4.
183. Id. at ¶ 98.
184. Id. at ¶ 101; see also id. at ¶¶ 104, 112 (noting appearance of impropriety independently of
Formal Op. 322).
185. Id. at ¶ 112; see also id. at ¶¶ 110, 111, 116, 117 (noting violations of appearance of
impropriety standard). Isaacs, along with former Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, were subsequently
convicted of bribery (failure to provide “honest services”) in federal court. See United States v. Isaacs,
493 F.2d 1124, 1166 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied Kerner v. United States, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
186. Bernard G. Segal, The President’s Page, 55 A.B.A. J. 847, 847 (1969).
187. Id. Segal, of course, was referring to the Fortas contretemps.
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update of judicial ethics rules. Due to “the need to move promptly,” the
Special Committee, led by retired California Supreme Court Chief Justice
Roger Traynor, issued its initial conclusions less than a year later.188 The
fifth of its ten preliminary conclusions stated a judge’s personal relations
should not “appear to influence his judicial conduct.”189 The eighth
conclusion, Disqualification, discussed only instances of actual bias or
interest, not its appearance.190
The following year, the Special Committee published a tentative draft.
Traynor listed sixteen “highlights.” As with its initial conclusions,
Traynor noted the appearance of impropriety standard just once, and on
the same subject: A judge was not to allow personal relations “to influence
or appear to influence the performance of his official duties.”191 The ABA
House of Delegates discussed the Committee’s Proposed Final Draft at its
February 1972 midyear meeting, and a final draft was adopted in
August.192
Unlike the 1924 Canons, the 1972 Code’s “canons and text
establish[ed] mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated.”193 These
mandatory standards were often, however, vaguely described. For
example, Canon 2, A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance
of Impropriety in All His Activities, listed just two broad admonitions.
First, a judge was to comply with the law and act “at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.”194 Second, the judge should not permit third parties to
“influence his judicial conduct and judgment.”195 This second admonition
also stated a judge “should not testify voluntarily as a character
witness.”196 The explanatory Commentary offered no assistance to one
188. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Standards of Jud. Conduct, 95 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 1048, 1048
(1970).
189. Id. at 1049–50.
190. Id. at 1050.
191. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Standards of Jud. Conduct, 96 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 733, 734
(1971).
192. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Standards of Jud. Conduct, 97 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 351, 351
(1972) (noting dissemination of proposed final draft of Code of Judicial Conduct); Rep. of the Special
Comm. on Standards of Jud. Conduct, 97 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 858, 858 (1972) (presenting the final
draft); id. at 556 (approving Code after adopting two minor amendments).
193. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preface (AM. BAR ASS’N, Proposed Final Draft 1972)
[hereinafter 1972 CODE].
194. Id. at Canon 2A.
195. Id. at Canon 2B.
196. Id. Neither the Commentary nor the Reporter’s Notes mention the most well-known
instance: the calling of sitting Supreme Court Justices Felix Frankfurter and Stanley Reed to testify as
character witnesses on behalf of Alger Hiss in Hiss’s first trial for perjury. See ALLEN WEINSTEIN,
PERJURY: THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE 399–401 (2d ed. 1997).
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uncertain about the definition and breadth of the appearance of
impropriety standard. It simply and unhelpfully repeated (substituting
“must” for “should”) the title: “A judge must avoid all impropriety and
appearance of impropriety.”197 The published Reporter’s Notes regarding
Canon 2 began, “[t]he black-letter statement of Canon 2 is very broad in
its terms and perhaps the nearest to being hortatory of any provision in the
Code.”198 Even so, the Reporter stated the Committee concluded, “despite
the generality, an ‘impropriety and the appearance of impropriety’
standard is necessary.”199 That was all.
As was its practice at this time, the ABA created a Special Committee
to assist in implementing the Code of Judicial Conduct as law in the states.
At the end of its three-year existence, the Special Committee stated thirtynine states, the District of Columbia, and the Judicial Conference of the
United States (making the Code applicable to all federal judges other than
Supreme Court Justices), had adopted it in part or whole. Two others had
adopted a small portion, and five of the remaining nine states were
engaged in “active studies of the ABA Code.”200 Most also ratified the
Commentary.201
The Reporter’s acknowledgment that Canon 2 was “nearest to being
hortatory”202 gave judicial disciplinary bodies an option. Canon 2 could
be interpreted just like the other Canons, as creating a “mandatory,”
enforceable standard. It might also serve solely as an aspirational goal.
Canon 9 of the 1969 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility applicable
to lawyers was titled, A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of
Professional Impropriety.203 The drafters of the lawyer’s Code called the
Canons “concise axiomatic statements.”204 The enforceable rules, called
Disciplinary Rules (DR), were specific prohibitions based on the broader
canonical norms, and “mandatory in character.”205 Based on Canon 9, DR
9-101(A) barred a lawyer from representing a client “in a matter upon the

197. 1972 CODE, supra note 193, at Canon 2 cmt.
198. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 49 (1973).
199. Id.
200. Rep. of the Special Comm. to Obtain Adoption of the Code of Jud. Conduct, 100 A.B.A.
ANN. REP. 859, 859, 860 (1975).
201. Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 949, 953
(1996) (noting ten did not) [hereinafter Abramson, Canon 2].
202. THODE, supra note 198, at 49.
203. CODE OF PRO. RESP. Canon 9 (Am. Bar Ass’n Special Comm. on Evaluation of Ethical
Standards) (1969).
204. Id. at Preamble.
205. Id.
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merits of which he has acted in a judicial capacity.”206 This was simply
the converse of the long-held rule that a judge was disqualified from a
matter if the judge had previously represented a party as their lawyer.
Judicial disciplinary authorities could reasonably point to Canon 9 and the
DR 9-101(A) to justify making Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
a mandatory standard.
Additionally, employees and commissioners of the judicial conduct
organizations had an interest in the success and thus continued existence
of their organizations. Making Canon 2 mandatory gave those
organizations more options to make their mark.207 Despite the “nearly”
hortatory nature of Canon 2, courts and judicial conduct organizations took
the drafters at their word: Judges were subject to discipline for creating an
appearance of impropriety.
In 1978, the ABA adopted model Standards of Judicial Discipline and
Disability Retirement.208 The Standards urged each state (all but four had
already done so) to create a commission to regulate judicial conduct, and
to do so by state constitutional amendment.209 The Standards noted each
state’s highest court possessed the “inherent” power to discipline judges
short of removing them from office.210 The creation of a judicial conduct
commission by constitutional amendment was intended to add removal
and involuntary retirement as disciplinary tools available to the judicial
branch. Standard 3.3, Grounds, listed various justifications for discipline.
Standard 3.3(d) declared “conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice . . . that brings the judicial office into disrepute” was sufficient, as
was any conduct that violated codes of judicial or legal ethics.211 In the
Commentary, the drafters wrote, “[t]his standard provides that not only
impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety that brings the judicial
office into disrepute may be a basis for commission action.”212

206. Id. at DR 9-101(A).
207. Cf. Jonathan Abel, Testing Three Commonsense Intuitions about Judicial Conduct
Commissions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2012) (concluding “[w]ell-funded commissions
discipline judges more often than underfunded commissions”).
208. Rep. of the App. Judges’ Conf. and the Standing Comm. on Pro. Discipline, 103 A.B.A.
ANN. REP. 454, 454–55 (1978) (issuing tentative proposal); Proceedings of the 1978 Midyear Meeting
of the House of Delegates, 103 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 203, 233–35 (1978) (debating and approving the
Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement).
209. Id. at 457 (Standard 1.4).
210. Id. at 456 (Standard 1.1).
211. Id. at 461 (Standard 3.3(d)).
212. Id. (Standard 3.3 and Commentary).
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2. Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety
And so, courts and judicial conduct organizations began using the
appearance of impropriety standard to discipline judges. The most recent
iteration of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct was
created by constitutional amendment in late 1977, and the Commission
began its work in April 1978.213 It possessed the authority to determine
whether to admonish or to remove from office a judge, subject to review
by the New York Court of Appeals.214 One of its earliest efforts was to
review four charges that Justice Morris Spector had made appointments in
violation of New York’s Canons of Judicial Ethics, specifically the
prohibition of an appearance of impropriety. The New York Canons were
based on the ABA’s 1972 Code.215
Spector v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct is an early and wellknown example of judicial discipline for creating an appearance of
impropriety.216 Three New York trial judges had sons who practiced law.
Between March 1968 and November 1974, Justice Spector appointed
Stanford Postel, the son of Justice George Postel, on four occasions, and
Burton Fine, the son of Justice Sidney Fine, on two occasions. The referee
found these appointments were not “free from the appearance of
impropriety,” though he also found no actual impropriety.217 Justice Fine
appointed Spector’s son eight times and Postel’s son ten times. And
Justice Postel appointed Spector’s son five times.218 Spector was aware of
his son’s appointments during this time. The Commission found no quid
pro quo but agreed Spector’s actions violated the appearance of
impropriety standard.219 A majority concluded Spector’s actions were
subject to admonishment.220 Spector requested review by the Court of
Appeals.
In a per curiam opinion, the court agreed.221 It concluded Spector’s
knowledge that his son received appointments from Fine and Postel at the
time Spector appointed the sons of Fine and Postel “inescapably created a
213. N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON JUD. MISCONDUCT, 1979 ANN. REP. 1, 6 [hereinafter 1979 ANN.
REP.] (noting history of commission).
214. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22 (amended 2002).
215. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 213, at 77 (App. E) (Matter of Morris Spector) (report for 1978
calendar year).
216. 392 N.E.2d 552 (N.Y. 1979).
217. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 213, at 77–78; Spector, 392 N.E.2d at 552.
218. Spector, 392 N.E.2d at 552–53.
219. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 213, at 78–79.
220. Spector, 392 N.E.2d at 552–53.
221. Id. at 555.
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circumstantial appearance of impropriety.”222
The dissent by Justice Fuchsberg initially noted no specific rule of
judicial conduct applied to this apparent cross-nepotism.223 The
appointments were made openly and publicly, and no one argued the sons
were incompetent lawyers.224 Next, the appointments were but a few of
the thousands made by Spector in his lengthy judicial career, and none
generated substantial fees for Fine or Postel.225 Third, though he began his
dissent by suggesting his amenability to applying the appearance of
impropriety standard in the right case, Fuchsberg suggested this standard
was “beset by legal and moral complexity.”226 Thus, it should be
considered largely “hortatory,” and “not to be freely applied.”227
“[A]bsent an accompanying substantive breach, a mere appearance of
impropriety should not automatically merit condemnation.”228
Spector was unusual in relying solely on the appearance of
impropriety standard to discipline a judge. In most decisions on judicial
conduct, organizations or courts found some substantive violation in
addition to the appearance of impropriety.229 For example, in In re Wait,
Judge Almon Wait presided in six matters in which a relative was a party
within the sixth degree of relationship of Judge Wait or his spouse.230 New
York law disqualified a judge in such circumstances.231 The New York
State Commission on Judicial Conduct and the New York Court of
Appeals both concluded he should be removed from office: “The handling
by a judge of a case to which a family member is a party creates an
appearance of impropriety as well as a very obvious potential for abuse,
and threatens to undermine the public’s confidence in the impartiality of
the judiciary.”232 In addition to concluding Wait violated Canon 2, both
222. Id.
223. Id. at 556 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 557.
227. Id.
228. Id. He also noted the appearance of impropriety standard raised a due process vagueness
claim. See id.
229. See, e.g., In re Bonin, 378 N.E.2d 669, 706 (Mass. 1978); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge,
788 P.2d 716, 723 (Alaska 1990); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 822 P.2d 1333, 1342 (Alaska
1991); In re Alvord, 847 P.2d 1310, 1314 (Kan. 1993); Adams v. Comm’n on Jud. Performance, 897
P.2d 544, 546 (Cal. 1995); In re Harris, 713 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (La. 1998); In re Gerard, 631 N.W.2d
271, 279–80 (Iowa 2001); In re Mosley, 102 P.3d 555, 558 (Nev. 2004).
230. In re Wait, 490 N.E.2d 502, 502–03 (N.Y. 1986).
231. N.Y. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT § 100.3E(1)(d).
232. In re Wait, 490 N.E.2d at 503; see also In re Snow, 674 A.2d 573, 574, 577–79 (N.H. 1996)
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bodies concluded he also violated Canon 1 and Canon 3(C)(1).233
The New York Commission’s annual reports do not categorize the
types of investigated complaints by the specific canons or code provisions
allegedly violated. However, all of the Commission’s determinations are
available from Westlaw in its New York Commission on Judicial Conduct
Disciplinary Opinions file. A Boolean search in that file from 1978–1990
including the terms “appear!” and “improp!” returned thirty-four
decisions.234 The same search for the period 1978–2021 returned 296
decisions.235 In the Commission’s 1991 Annual Report, recounting the
1990 year, it lists two removal determinations, six determinations of
censure, and five of admonition.236 Even without a search of each annual
report, the number of determinations listed suggests the routine use of the
appearance of impropriety by the Commission.
A decade after Spector, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided a case
only on appearance of impropriety grounds.237 Irvin Carmouche won a
large judgment against the State of Louisiana.238 Carmouche needed the
state legislature to pass a bill appropriating funds to pay that judgment.239
This seemed in some doubt when Carmouche spoke with Judge Joel
Chaisson. Chaisson agreed to ask about the state of negotiations when he
went to Baton Rouge to testify to the Legislature regarding another bill.
He did and reported back to Carmouche.240 Later, Carmouche and his
lawyers disputed the fee owed. Carmouche asked Chaisson if Chaisson’s
son Joel II was capable of handling this type of case for Carmouche.
Chaisson said he was.241 After the fee dispute was resolved in favor of
Carmouche and against his former lawyers, the latter complained about
(concluding judge’s call to police officer regarding a ticket the officer gave judge’s brother violated
both Canon 1 and Canon 2) and In re Harned, 357 N.W.2d 300, 301–02 (Iowa 1984) (holding judge
violated both Canon 1 and Canon 2 in attempting to have dismissed a ticket issued to her daughter).
233. In re Wait, 490 N.E.2d at 503.
234. N.Y. Comm’n on Jud. Conduct Disciplinary Ops., (“adv: appear! w/2 improp!”), WESTLAW,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/AdministrativeDecisionsGuidance/NewYorkAdministrati
veDecisionsGuidance/NewYorkCommissiononJudicialConductDisciplinaryOpinions?originationCo
ntext=typeAhead&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)
[https://perma.cc/LP7F-T6GV] (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
235. Id.
236. N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON JUD. MISCONDUCT, ANN. REP., MARCH 1991, at i (1991) (listing
determinations
in
Table
of
Contents),
https://cjc.ny.gov/Publications/AnnualReports/nyscjc.1991annualreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9HBZUZ5].
237. In re Chaisson, 549 So. 2d 259 (La. 1989).
238. Id. at 261.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 261–62.
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Chaisson’s conduct.242
The Louisiana Judiciary Commission found Chaisson had violated
Canons 1, 2, 4, and 7 of the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct.243 The
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld only the charge that Chaisson had
violated Canon 2 by creating an appearance of impropriety in contacting
legislators and in speaking with the Assistant Attorney General, who was
involved in the negotiations with Carmouche’s then-attorneys.244 It
concluded Chaisson had not violated any other code provision because “no
evidence” existed that Chaisson “actually influenced” the settlement
between Carmouche and the State, nor could such influence be “readily
inferred from the circumstantial evidence in the record.”245 Chaisson had
objectively created an appearance of impropriety by “‘lend[ing] the
prestige of his office to advance the private interest’ of Carmouche.”246
Chaisson’s private pleading and the short time between Chaisson’s
conversations and the settlement of Carmouche’s case gave a reasonable
person suspicion of “some improper influence” by Chaisson for
Carmouche’s benefit.247
In In re Blackman, Municipal Court Judge Robert Blackman attended
a Labor Day party hosted by a friend of eighteen years, Thomas Heroy.248
Heroy had been convicted of federal racketeering charges and was soon
off to prison. Blackman’s attendance at the party, along with other notable
local public figures, was publicized in the local newspaper.249 The New
Jersey Supreme Court held Blackman’s attendance at Heroy’s annual
Labor Day party created an appearance of impropriety.250 Blackman’s
conduct could be perceived as evidencing sympathy for the convicted
individual or disagreement with the criminal justice system that brought
about the conviction. At worst, such conduct may raise questions
concerning the judge’s allegiance to the judicial system. Those
impressions could generate legitimate concern about the judge’s attitude
toward judicial responsibilities, weakening confidence in the judge and
242. Id. at 262. They also complained about a real estate transaction between Carmouche and
Chaisson, in which Joel Chaisson II also represented Carmouche. Id. at 261. The result was four
initial charges.
243. Id. at 260.
244. Id. at 263.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 591 A.2d 1339, 1340 (N.J. 1991).
249. Id. at 1340, 1342 (“Subsequent newspaper accounts interpreted respondent’s attendance as
support for Heroy and characterized the event as a going-away party for Heroy as he was about to
begin his prison term.”).
250. Id. at 1342.
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the judiciary.251

Blackman was publicly reprimanded.
Finally, in 2000, the Supreme Court of Alaska publicly reprimanded a
judge for creating an appearance of impropriety because he hired a
coroner.252 The Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct found no actual
impropriety by Judge Johnstone, but concluded that, by creating an
appearance of impropriety, Johnstone was subject to discipline.253
These were the rare cases in which a judge was disciplined only for
failing to avoid an appearance of impropriety. In nearly all cases in which
a judge was found in violation of the appearance of impropriety standard,
the judge was also found to have had violated another, and more
substantive, Canon.
3. Disqualifying Judges for an Appearance of Impropriety
Canon 3(C)(1) of the 1972 Code declared a judge “should disqualify
himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”254 This Canon would lead to a massive increase in judicial
disqualification motions based on an appearance of impropriety.
How was Canon 3(C)(1) to work? The Traynor Committee’s
Reporter, E. Wayne Thode, explained the link between the Canon 3
disqualification standard and Canon 2 appearance of impropriety standard
in his published Reporter’s Notes: “[A]n impropriety or the appearance of
impropriety in violation of Canon 2 that would reasonably lead one to
question the judge’s impartiality in a given proceeding clearly falls within
the scope of the general standard.”255 Thus, the appearance of impropriety
standard “officially became, and would continue to be, the heart of judicial
ethics.”256
When Congress was debating whether to adopt the substance of Canon
3(C)(1) in mid-1973, Thode testified.257 He was asked a hypothetical
251. Id. at 1341–42. A second charge regarding Blackman’s law partner’s representation of the
local police chief was dismissed. Id. at 1342–44.
252. In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Alaska 2000).
253. Id.
254. CANON 3(C)(1), CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1972).
255. THODE, supra note 198, at 61.
256. Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety: What the
Public Sees is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 1930 (2010).
257. Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their Impartiality Might Reasonably be
Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 411, 437–38 (2014) [hereinafter
Disqualifying Judges].
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about the applicability of the appearance of impropriety: Should a judge
be disqualified if an attorney for one of the parties was a “distant cousin”
whom the judge had not seen in thirty years and to whom he was not close?
Canon 3(C)(1)(a)–(d) gave four particular instances when a judge should
disqualify herself, all of which had been accepted for over a century-anda-half: party bias or prejudice, having previously served as a lawyer to one
of the parties in the matter, having an interest in the matter (including
family members having such an interest), or having a family member (or
spouse’s family member) “within the third degree of relationship” who
was a party or lawyer.258 Canon 3(C)(3) counted “third degree” through
the civil law method. That method, as noted by the accompanying
Commentary to Canon 3(C)(3), meant a “cousin” was in the fourth-degree
of relationship, and thus excepted from this rule.259 Thus, the answer to
this question was “no.” But because the introduction to Canon 3(C)(1)
ended with, “including but not limited to” those four listed instances,
Thode answered, it depends: Recusal was necessary if the judge “decided
that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned under those
circumstances.”260 The appearance of impropriety standard was to be
interpreted by repeating the language of the standard.261
This approach opened the gates for lawyers seeking to disqualify
judges for creating an appearance of impropriety. Lawyers struggled
economically during the 1970s and cleaved tighter to their clients.262
Zealous representation often became overzealous representation, as
lawyers looked to find any edge favoring their clients, including moving
to disqualify the judge. Canon 3(C)(1) assisted the rise in judicial
disqualification motions in the 1970s and 1980s.
Motions to disqualify were joined by an increasing sensitivity to
appearances by courts. Though the disqualification rule was a “reasonable
person” standard, it was interpreted elastically. On occasion, courts urged
disqualification even when it was not required. For example, in Johnson
v. Hornblass, the New York Appellate Division refused to disqualify the
trial judge from hearing post-conviction motions.263 Justice Jerome
Hornblass was alleged by the district attorney of having an “extra-judicial”
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See text accompanying footnotes 11–21.
THODE, supra note 198.
Disqualifying Judges, supra note 257, at 438.
Id.
See Michael Ariens, The Agony of Modern Legal Ethics, 1970-1985, 5 ST. MARY’S J. ON
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 134, 171–73 (2014) (discussing economic downturn for lawyers
during 1970s).
263. 461 N.Y.S.2d 277, 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
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involvement in a criminal matter that disqualified him.264 Hornblass’s
orders regarding the confinement of a convicted person had been flouted,
and Hornblass visited the facilities and the convicted defendant to ensure
his subsequent orders had been followed.265 Hornblass was neither biased
nor interested, and thus not subject to disqualification under the laws of
New York.266
Although the Appellate Division concluded Hornblass had not abused
his discretion in declining to recuse himself, it urged him to do so anyway:
[W]e suggest that the “appearance of justice” might be better served by
his recusal. We are confident that he recognizes, as do we, that judicial
proceedings should never be conducted save in a manner and under
circumstances that reflect complete impartiality. Not only must there be
no partiality in fact, even the appearance of partiality is to be avoided.267

In Smith v. Beckman, a trial judge was married to a deputy district
attorney.268 She was not involved in the criminal case over which her
husband was to preside.269 The accused moved to disqualify the judge.
The marriage of the deputy district attorney and the judge was insufficient
to require recusal under the Colorado rules of criminal procedure.270 Even
so, the judge was disqualified from the case based on an appearance of
impropriety, solely because he was married to a deputy district attorney.
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded judges needed to act “to
enhance the respect of the judiciary in the eyes of the public.”271 Thus,
“the possibility that the facts alleged may give rise to the appearance of
impropriety must always receive the highest consideration in ruling on a
motion for disqualification.”272 The fact of marriage was sufficient to
create a “possibility” that “may give rise to the appearance of
impropriety.”273 This test went well beyond the reasonable person test. As
phrased, the disqualification standard presented was modest indeed.
The 1972 Code wrought extensive changes in the law of judicial
disqualification. As noted by a critic (and former judge), the interpretation
of Canon 3(C)(1) “constituted an unprecedented expansion of the grounds
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 279 (citing N.Y. Judiciary L. § 14).
Id.
683 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Colo. App. 1984).
Id. at 1215–16.
Id. at 1216.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1215.
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for judicial recusal.”274 This unprecedented expansion was nationwide,
given the 1972 Code’s widespread adoption by states. The appearance of
impropriety standard was nearly always a part of a state’s code of judicial
conduct.275 State courts regularly applied the appearance standard to
disqualification motions after adopting the 1972 Code.276
State appellate courts routinely referred to the importance of avoiding
the appearance of impropriety as essential in promoting public confidence
in the judicial branch. Like the Smith v. Beckman court, they often made
avoiding an appearance of impropriety the “highest consideration” in
deciding disqualification motions.277 Many litigants, lawyers, and critics
of the judiciary argued courts needed to make quick, efficient, and
relatively inexpensive justice the highest consideration of courts. A
greater fastidiousness regarding judicial disqualification meant justice
delayed. And too often justice delayed was justice denied. This was a
practical result of the increased application of a broad appearance of
impropriety standard.
D. The Appearance of Impropriety and the 1990 Model Code
The 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct intentionally followed the

274. Disqualifying Judges, supra note 257, at 413.
275. A 2005 law review article noted, “all states but Oregon and Montana referred to the
appearance of impropriety in their codes of conduct.” Cynthia Gray, Avoiding the Appearance of
Impropriety: With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 63, 65
n.10 (2005). Montana adopted the 2007 Model Code in 2009, including the appearance of impropriety
Canon
and
Rule
1.2.
See
MONT. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2009),
https://courts.mt.gov/external/supreme/new_rules/rules/jud-canons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4PFZUMW]. North Carolina eliminated the “appearance of impartiality” in 2003. See Order Adopting
Amends. to the N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (Adopted April 2, 2003),
https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/course_materials/CodeofJudicialConduct.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TRF8-5UQ9] (amending North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and striking
“appearance of impropriety” standard from Canon 2).
276. See, e.g., King v. State, 271 S.E.2d 630, 633 (Ga. 1980); Stephens v. Stephens, 292 S.E.2d
689, 702–03 (Ga. 1982); State ex rel. Div. of Fam. Servs. v. Oatsvall, 612 S.W.2d 447, 452–53 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981); State ex rel. Ferrell v. Heckemeyer, 629 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Papa
v. New Haven Fed’n of Tchrs, 444 A.2d 196, 207 (Conn. 1982); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 476 A.2d
422, 426 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Timm v. Timm, 487 A.2d 191, 193–94 (Conn. 1985); Mun. Publ’ns,
Inc. v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 489 A.2d 1286, 1289 (Pa. 1985); Birt v. State, 350 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Ga.
1986); In re Turney, 533 A.2d 916, 917 (Md. 1987); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768,
842 (Tex. App. 1987); Dubaldo v. Dubaldo, 542 A.2d 750, 751–52 (Conn. 1988); Bonelli v. Bonelli,
557 A.2d 559, 561 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989); Sussel v. Honolulu Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 784 P.2d 867, 868
(Haw. 1989); In re Rowe, 566 A.2d 1001, 1008 (Del. 1989), and cases cited therein; see also Leslie
W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might Reasonably
be Questioned”, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 76–102 (2000) (listing by type disqualification cases
based on an appearance of impropriety) [hereinafter Abramson, Appearance].
277. Beckman, 683 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Colo. App. 1984).
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format of the 1972 Code with a few additions. Most importantly, it
clarified the phrasing of disciplinary rules for use to discipline judges:
“When the text uses ‘shall’ or ‘shall not,’ it is intended to impose binding
obligations the violation of which can result in disciplinary action.”278
“Should” was “hortatory,” and “may” gave the judge “permissible
discretion.”279
Canon 2 was altered only to replace “should” with “shall,” and “his”
with “[a] judge.”280 The two rules of Canon 2 remained, and the 1990
Model Code added a third rule barring a judge from “membership in any
organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, religion or national origin.”281 One addition to the Commentary
emphasized the test of an appearance of impropriety: “Whether the
conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s
ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and
competence is impaired.”282
The Preamble to the 1990 Model Code stated, “the text of the Canons
and the Sections,” or specific rules, were “authoritative.”283 Additionally,
though “shall” and “shall not” were “intended to impose binding
obligations the violation of which can result in disciplinary action,” the
Canons and Sections were also to be interpreted as “rules of reason.”284
Just like the 1972 Code, Canon 2 was followed by Sections (rules)
implementing the duty to “avoid impropriety.” A judge avoided
impropriety by “respect[ing] and comply[ing] with the law . . . .”285
Canon 2B demanded the judge not permit others to “influence the judge’s
judicial conduct or judgment.”286 But neither of these nor new Canon 2C
implemented the duty of the judge to avoid the appearance of impropriety.
As the Reporters for the 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct noted, the
appearance of impropriety “was the only language from the 1990 Code
embedded in a Canon, but not in a more specific underlying section.”287
Yet, they continued, “disciplinary authorities” had alleged judicial
misconduct for failing to avoid an appearance of impropriety “in

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preamble (1990).
Id.
Id. at Canon 2.
Id. at Canon 2C.
Id. at Canon 2A, cmt.
Id. at Preamble.
Id.
Id. at Canon 2A.
Id. at Canon 2B.
GEYH & HODES, supra note 4, at 3.
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enforcement actions.”288
By early 1996, thirty states and the Judicial Conference had adopted
the 1990 Model Code.289 Only Montana had not adopted some version of
either the 1972 Code or the 1990 Model Code by 2005.290 Most states
adopting the 1990 Code also adopted the Commentary.291 Under either
Code of Judicial Conduct, state courts applied the appearance of
impropriety standard in both disciplinary and disqualification matters.
And as one perceptive critic noted in 1996, courts “often include Canon
2’s general language about the appearance of impropriety when that
standard is not the stated basis for the disciplinary charges against the
judge or for the appeal of a civil or criminal judgment.”292
IV. THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY AND THE 2007 MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT
A. To Keep or Jettison the Appearance of Impropriety Standard
In September 2003, the ABA decided to again evaluate its code of
judicial conduct.293 The Joint Commission reduced the number of Canons
from seven to four and organized those Canons more efficiently.294 One
result was to move the duty to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety to Canon 1.295
The May 2004 Draft of Canon 1 did not include any rule making it a
disciplinary violation for a judge to create an appearance of impropriety.296
In a memorandum contemporaneous with this initial draft, Joint
Commission Chair Mark Harrison invited comments, including whether
288. Id.
289. Abramson, Canon 2 supra note 201, at 950 n.3; see also Gray, supra note 275, at 64 n.7
(noting all states other than Montana, as well as the District of Columbia and the federal Judicial
Conference, adopted either the 1972 or 1990 Code).
290. Gray, supra note 275, at 64 n.7.
291. Abramson, Canon 2, supra note 201, at 953 n.13 (listing nine states as adopting none (7) or
part (2) of the Commentary).
292. Id. at 952.
293. About
the
Commission,
A M.
BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/judicial_code_revision_proj
ect/about/ [https://perma.cc/VY9V-QYYK] (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
294. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
295. Id. at Canon 1.
296. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Draft May 2004). The
ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct from 2003–2007’s drafts and
reports
are
available
at
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/judicial_code_revision_proj
ect/drafts/.
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Canon 1’s attempt to remind judges of their duty to avoid an appearance
of impropriety, “while addressing concerns for vagueness,” was
sufficient.297
Comments to this initial draft were numerous.298 One was from the
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL).299 APRL
was an organization some of whose members often defended “judges and
lawyers against disciplinary charges.”300 It concluded that the appearance
of impropriety standard “collides with the standards of basic fairness and
due process.”301 It “read with interest” the Joint Commission’s initial draft
and commended the Commission’s proposal not to include a rule of
discipline for an appearance of impropriety. This was “an important first
step in limiting the scope of the AOR [appearance of impropriety]
Requirement.”302
The draft language remained a first step because APRL believed the
incorporation of the appearance of impropriety in Canon 1 and a reference
to it in Comment 2 “creates a drafting imbalance.”303 Further, states that
did not adopt the Commentary might still use the appearance of
impropriety standard. It was better simply to state, in either Canon 1.01
or in the Preamble, that appearance of impropriety “may not serve as an
independent basis for discipline.”304
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility supported APRL’s view in a memorandum dated April 12,
2005.305
Some committee members believed the appearance of
297. Memorandum from Mark Harrison, Chair of the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct Chair, to Individuals and Entities Interested in Judicial Ethics, 2 (May
11,
2004),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/judicialethi
cs/memo_canon1_051104.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ3R-SY4R].
298. See
Judicial
Code
Revision
Project,
Comments,
A M.
BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/judicial_code_revision_proj
ect/comments_rules/#commentsprelim [https://perma.cc/A7ZM-E58J] (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
299. Letter from Ronald C. Minkoff, APRL Committee on Model Code of Judicial Conduct
Chair, to ABA Commission on the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (June 30, 2004),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/judicialethi
cs/resources/comm_rules_minkoff_063004.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MYC-4STV].
300. Id. at 7.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 11.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See Memorandum from Charles E. McCallum, Chair of the Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility to Mark Harrison, Chair of the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate
the
Model
Code
of
Judicial
Conduct
(Apr.
12,
2005)
at
2,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/judicialethi
cs/resources/comm_rules_aba_ethics_committee_41205_ddt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U4U-NJSD].
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impropriety was “too vague a standard to have value or predictability for
the purpose of enforcing discipline.”306 Others believed the standard
susceptible of a constitutional challenge.307
In its June 2005 Preliminary Report, the Joint Commission added Rule
1.03, which simply repeated the canonical declaration on impropriety: “A
judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”308 The
Commission’s Introductory Report discussed the tension over the issue of
the appearance of impropriety.309 It noted, “[a] majority of commentators
on the subject, citing to judicial discipline cases decided over a threedecade period, urged that the concept be retained.”310 The Commission
was convinced by the majority and added Rule 1.03 to make it a
disciplinary violation to create an appearance of impropriety.311 Unlike
the 1972 Code and the 1990 Model Code, a “Scope” note—adopted in the
2007 Model Code—indicated that a judge was subject to discipline only if
the judge violated a rule. The Canons were “overarching principles of
judicial ethics.”312 Though “cast in mandatory terms,” only the rules
“establish independently enforceable standards of judicial conduct.”313
For the “majority” of commenters intent on keeping an “appearance of
impropriety” disciplinary standard, the inclusion of a rule was thus
necessary.
The Joint Commission’s December 2005 Final Draft Report
reaffirmed its decision to include a rule requiring a judge to avoid an
appearance of impropriety, though it moved this prohibition to Rule
1.02.314 The Joint Commission’s Introductory Report adopted the
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.03 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Preliminary Draft 2005),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/judicialethi
cs/Canon1.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8TF-EF3W].
309. INTRODUCTORY REPORT, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ABA JOINT COMM’N TO
EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (ABA Joint Comm’n to Evaluate the Model Code of
Jud.
Conduct),
June
30,
2005,
at
4,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/judicialethi
cs/IntroductoryReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVK6-AJDR].
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N, Preliminary Draft 2005),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/judicialethi
cs/Scope.pdf [https://perma.cc/WU56-HUHX].
313. Id.
314. INTRODUCTION TO FINAL DRAFT REPORT (ABA Joint Comm’n to Evaluate the Model Code
of
Jud.
Conduct),
Dec.
2005,
at
4,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/judicialethi
cs/IntroductoryReportFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZE6-3TZA].
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reasoning (and language) it used in the June 2005 explanation.315
Ten months later, the Introductory Report to the Proposed Revised
Code repeated (again) the Commission’s view supporting the majority
regarding appearance of impropriety. But it excluded the sentence that
added a rule of discipline in such cases. Proposed Revised Code Draft
Rule 1.02, requiring a judge to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety, was deleted. In the Reporters’ Explanation of Canon 1, the
Commission stated it “was persuaded to eliminate the black letter rule,
which could prove a lightning rod for court challenge, and to retain
‘Avoidance of Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety’ in the
Canon.”316
Thus, a judge could not be disciplined for an appearance of
impropriety, for the “Scope” note distinguished between the aspirational
goals of the canons and the mandatory standards of the rules. The Joint
Commission to the ABA House of Delegates maintained this approach to
the appearance of impropriety in its December 2006 Final Report to the
ABA.317
That’s where the proposed Code stood until the CCJ adopted
Resolution 3 on February 7, 2007. In response to the CCJ’s demand,
proposed Rule 1.2 of the Code was amended to read, “[a] judge shall act
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” The House of Delegates
then approved that revision, voting down an amendment to eliminate
“appearance of impropriety” from Rule 1.2.318
B. The Appearance of Impropriety and the Discipline of Judges
The worst fears of proponents of the appearance of impropriety
standard have not come true: No court has held unconstitutional on
vagueness or related grounds broad statements of misconduct, including

315. Id.
316. Canon 1: Reporter’s [sic] Explanation of Changes, REP. NOV. 2006 (ABA Joint Comm’n to
Evaluate
the
Model
Code
of
Jud.
Conduct)
Oct.
31,
2006,
at
30,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/judicialethi
cs/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NS7-WNCV].
317. ABA JOINT COMMISSION TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, REPORT
4
(2007),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/judicialethi
cs/house_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2MD-2RVF].
318. Proceedings of the 2007 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 132:1 A.B.A. ANN.
REP. 27–28 (2007) and see text accompanying notes 1–10.
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avoiding the appearance of impropriety. In Alred v. Commonwealth,
Judicial Conduct Commission, Judge Russell Alred challenged the
constitutionality of Canons 1 and 2A of Kentucky’s Code of Judicial
Conduct on due process vagueness grounds.319 Kentucky’s Code was then
borrowed from the 1990 Model Code, including Canon 2A, which
required judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.320
The Supreme Court of Kentucky dismissed Alred’s constitutional
argument, holding the Canons were sufficiently clear: “Judge Alred was
well aware that he was required to follow the law and that if he chose not
to do so, he might be disciplined for engaging in behavior that was
detrimental to the public’s perception of the integrity and impartiality of
the bench.”321
Courts and judicial conduct commissions continue to discipline judges
for an appearance of impropriety. A search for “appearance of impropriety
in judicial discipline matters since 2007” in the Westlaw federal and state
court databases lists over 100 cases.322 These numbers suggest the utility
of appearance of impropriety in judicial discipline matters. More
important is whether this standard is necessary to effectively regulate
judicial misconduct.
Of all the states, only the judicial conduct codes of Oregon and North
Carolina do not include an appearance of impropriety standard. Whether
the appearance of impropriety standard is necessary to regulate judicial
conduct may be inferred from the record of those two states and
comparisons with other states which include such a standard.
Oregon’s records on judicial discipline are spotty.323 Records from
2006 through 2020 list an average of three informal dispositions per year,
with the numbers trending higher from 2016, averaging 5.2 informal
dispositions yearly through 2020. An informal disposition indicates a
judge, in the Commission’s view, violated a provision of the Oregon Code
319. 395 S.W.3d 417, 422 (Ky. 2012).
320. In 2018, Kentucky adopted a version of the ABA’s 2007 Model Code, see KY. CODE OF
JUD.
CONDUCT,
https://kycourts.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/Supreme%20Court%20Orders/201804.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z3M-KW5B].
321. Alred, 395 S.W.3d at 426. The court cited other state supreme court decisions reaching the
same result, including Judicial Inquiry and Review Comm’n v. Taylor, 685 S.E.2d 51 (Va. 2009); In
re McGuire, 685 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 2004); In re Hill, 8 S.W.3d 582 (Mo. 2000); Miss. Comm’n on
Judicial Performance v. Spencer, 725 So.2d 171 (Miss. 1998). See also In re Assad, 185 P.3d 1044,
1052 n.23 (Nev. 2008) (rejecting vagueness challenge and citing cases).
322. A Boolean search on Westlaw (adv: judge AND “appearance #of impropriety” w/s disciplin!
AND “judicial conduct” (aft 2006)) returns 183 cases (last searched Mar. 4, 2022).
323. Telephone Conversation with Rachel Mortimer, Executive Director, Oregon Commission
on Judicial Fitness and Disability (Dec. 21, 2021). My thanks to Director Mortimer for gathering the
date presented.
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of Judicial Conduct. Such violation is sufficiently minor that it requires
no public statement, and the letter officially dismisses the matter.324 The
Commission has no authority to issue public reprimands or
admonishments, nor to suspend or retire judges.325 The Commission’s
records of formal investigations only exist from 2012 through 2020. They
range from zero to three in any given year. Public prosecutions of judges
also range from zero to three in any year. From 2006 through 2020, the
Oregon Supreme Court decided eight judicial conduct cases. Five resulted
in censure, two in suspension (30 days and three years), and one was
dismissed at the request of the Oregon Commission.326
Kentucky’s population is slightly greater than Oregon’s, which may
make it a useful comparator state. In its Annual Report for the fiscal year
2019–2020, Kentucky’s Judicial Conduct Commission reported six
sanctions: two private admonitions, one private reprimand, two public
reprimands, and one retirement.327 In 2013, it issued two private
reprimands and three public reprimands.328 The Commission’s reports
from 2013 through 2021 suggest a robust Commission that has privately
and publicly reprimanded, suspended, and on occasion, retired judges.329
The Kentucky Commission has issued more sanctions than Oregon’s
Commission during the past fifteen years. One important reason is the
greater power given to the Kentucky Commission than the Oregon
Commission. A second reason may be the resources given the Kentucky
Commission, and a third reason may be that it is simply more vigorous in
regulating judicial conduct. However, Kentucky and Oregon may be so
culturally distinct that comparisons offer little of value.
A search of Kentucky’s decisions regulating judicial behavior does not
indicate a need for the appearance of impropriety. Several decisions
sanctioning judges relied on the judge’s failure to maintain the
324. See Executive Director Rachel Mortimer, Oregon 2006-2020 CJFD Investigations (2006–
2020 Excel spreadsheet) (on file with author).
325. Id.
326. See
Search
Results
“CJFD,”
STATE
OF
O R.
L.
LIBR.,
https://cdm17027.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/search/searchterm/CJFD [https://perma.cc/6G7E-7HS2]
(last visited Mar. 4, 2022) (listing fifteen cases since 1998).
327. Judicial Conduct Commission Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2019-2020 (Ky. Jud. Conduct
Comm’n)
at
1,
https://kycourts.gov/Courts/JCC%20Documents/JCFY20192020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F87L-PHTG].
328. Jud. Conduct Comm’n, KY. CT. OF JUST., https://kycourts.gov/Courts/Pages/JudicialConduct-Commission.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2WWQLNCB#ctl00_ctl00_m_g_ce8b1413_e94f_4f74_ba1e_d946ec987e6e_ctl02_AccordionList_ctrl6_Co
llapse] (last visited Apr. 9, 2022) (under the heading “Judicial Conduct Commission Actions,” choose
“2013”).
329. Id.
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independence and integrity of the judiciary, or failure to act in a way that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, or failure to be faithful to the law.330 It does not appear the
Kentucky Commission’s work would be significantly affected by the
disappearance of the appearance of impropriety standard.
North Carolina’s experience in regulating judicial misconduct since
1972 may provide something of a natural experiment regarding the
necessity of an appearance of impropriety disciplinary standard. North
Carolina amended its Constitution in 1972, providing for the creation of
its Judicial Standards Commission.331 It also adopted the 1972 Code for
its judges in 1973. In the Commission’s first three years, 1973–1975,
several judges resigned during investigation, a handful were privately
reprimanded, and in a couple of cases, the Commission recommended
public censure.332 In 1977, four judges either resigned or retired,333 and
the following year the Commission made its first two recommendations of
removal from office.334 These early years saw a spike in complaints, most
of which concerned issues outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction.
However, it had a steady number of complaints that warranted
investigation, which resulted in resignation, retirement, or private
reprimand, and recommendations for public censure.
In its Twenty-Fifth Annual Report, the Commission provided
information on its work since its inception.335 It had issued twenty-two
reprimands and six censures during the investigative process over those
twenty-five years. It initiated fifty-three formal proceedings after
investigation.336 Of those fifty-three proceedings, ten resulted in
reprimands, thirty-two resulted in recommendations of censure, and seven
330. See, e.g., KY. JUD. CONDUCT COMM’N, In re Roberts, Agreed Order of Suspension (Jan. 17,
2019), https://kycourts.gov/Courts/JCC%20Actions%20Documents/2019AgreedOrderRoberts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X54V-69EM].
331. See First Annual Report of the Judicial Standards Commission, State of North Carolina,
Calendar Year 1973, 1973 N.C. 1 (on file with author). My thanks for Carolyn Dubay, Executive
Director of the North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission, for providing copies of the annual
reports of the Commission.
332. See id. at 6; Second Annual Report of the Judicial Standards Commission, State of North
Carolina, Calendar Year 1974, 1974 N.C. 1, 6 (on file with author); Third Annual Report of the
Judicial Standards Commission, State of North Carolina, Calendar Year 1973, 1973 N.C. 1, 6–7 (on
file with author).
333. Fifth Annual Report of the Judicial Standards Commission, State of North Carolina,
Calendar Year 1977, 1977 N.C. 1, 8–9 (on file with author).
334. Sixth Annual Report of the Judicial Standards Commission, State of North Carolina,
Calendar Year 1978, 1978 N.C. 1, 8, 10 (on file with author).
335. Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Judicial Standards Commission, State of North Carolina,
Calendar Year 1997, 1997 N.C. 1, app. C (on file with author).
336. Id.
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led the Commission to recommend removal.337 Five years later, in its
Thirtieth Annual Report, the number of recommended censures had
increased from four to twenty-nine, and removals from two to seven.338
Overall, during its first thirty years, the Judicial Standards
Commission issued about one and one-half reprimands and censures
during investigation, recommended an average of one public censure a
year, and suggested removal about once every three years.
In 2003, North Carolina amended its judicial conduct code. Among
the changes was eliminating the appearance of impropriety standard.339 It
adopted a slight variation of the 1990 Model Code in 2006, though it
followed its earlier decision and excluded the appearance of impropriety
standard when adopting this Code.340
The North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission’s Annual Reports
from 2010–2020 are available online.341 Included in each report is a “FiveYear Comparative Analysis.”342 In its 2010 Annual Report, the
Commission’s comparative analysis of the years 2006–2010 showed it
issued an average of 10.2 private letters of caution per year, 2.2 public
reprimands, a total of thirty-two statements of charges filed, and five
recommendations of public discipline.343 Its 2015 Report, which included
a summary of actions from 2011–2015, was similar.344 Beginning in 2014,
the Commission was no longer permitted to issue public reprimands.345
Fewer statements of charges (nine) were filed between 2011–2015 than in
the previous five years.
The 2020 Annual Report indicated a slightly busier Commission
337. Id. One case resulted in dismissal, in one the office was vacated, and two more resulted in
reprimands. Finally, in six no additional action was taken.
338. Thirtieth Annual Report of the Judicial Standards Commission, State of North Carolina,
Calendar Year 2002, 2002 N.C. 1, app. C (on file with author).
339. Michael Crowell, Recusal, N.C. SUPER. CT. JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, at 3–4 (2015),
https://benchbook.sog.unc.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/Recusal.pdf [https://perma.cc/5346-39LK].
340. N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2015), https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/inline-files/NCCode-of-Judicial-Conduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/76BM-VHW8].
341. Judicial Standards Commission Annual Report, N.C. JUD. BRANCH (June 4, 2021),
https://www.nccourts.gov/documents/publications/judicial-standards-commission-annual-report
[https://perma.cc/U3E8-U93V].
342. Id.
343. N.C. Jud. Standards Comm’n, 2010 Annual Report, 2010 N.C. 1, 6,
https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/publications/NCJSCAnnualReport2010.pdf?RNI_MBUD814swXrS7ayhzNUDrWriTGu3
[https://perma.cc/6E35UBLR].
344. See N.C. Jud. Standards Comm’n, 2015 Annual Report, 2015 N.C. 1, 9,
https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/publications/NCJSC-AnnualReport2015.pdf?o_NP2qaeEYjiNzpoc1wMNwUb5D8HM0Oi [https://perma.cc/RWT3-9TBU].
345. Id.
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during the years 2016–2020.346 It issued fifty-five private letters of caution
(an average of eleven per year), twenty statements of charges authorized,
and twelve recommendations for public discipline.347
The workload and decisions of the North Carolina Judicial Standards
Commission since the 2003 Amendment to the state’s judicial conduct
code have not changed in any significant way. Though it is nearly
impossible to prove that the absence of an appearance of impropriety
standard has not had any negative impact on the regulation of judicial
misconduct, the collected information found in the Annual Reports of the
Judicial Standards Commission suggests no necessity for that standard.
A second way to assess North Carolina’s experience is to compare it
with a nearby state similar in size. Georgia’s population is slightly larger
than North Carolina’s. Georgia’s Code of Judicial Conduct generally
adopted the form of the 2007 Model Code348 and the substance of the 1990
Model Code. Georgia did not include the proscription against impropriety
or the appearance of impropriety in its Rule 1.2.349 It did, however, include
this proscription in Canon 1 and in Comments [2] and [3] to Rule 1.2,350
as well as in paragraph [2] of the Preamble.351 The language in these
provisions followed the text of the 1990 Model Code. The Preamble to
Georgia’s Code of Judicial Conduct also followed the 1990 Model Code
by making “the text of the Canons and the Rules . . . authoritative.”352
Thus, a Georgia judge alleged to have violated the appearance of
impropriety was subject to discipline for violating Canon 1.353
The Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission’s 2020 Annual
Report stated three formal disciplinary charges were filed.354 It issued ten

346. See N.C. Jud. Standards Comm’n, 2020 Annual Report, 2020 N.C. 1, 14,
https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/publications/Judicial-Standards-Commission-AnnualReport-2020.pdf?WyPnwLapmz5hParPilUMbfARuHFB7dwT [https://perma.cc/LJ9Q-JH3T].
347. Id.
348. See GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2015), https://www.gasupreme.us/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/georgia_code_judicial_conduct_revised_5-14-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RCB7-KC57].
349. Id.
350. GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 2, 3 (2015), https://www.gasupreme.us/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/georgia_code_judicial_conduct_revised_5-14-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KWC2-P7BS].
351. GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preamble (2015), https://www.gasupreme.us/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/georgia_code_judicial_conduct_revised_5-14-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2MXA-XD6U].
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. GA. JUD. QUALIFICATIONS COMM’N, 2020 ANN. REP., at 5, https://gajqc.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/13/2021/05/JQC-Annual-Report-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN84-BG8W].
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cautions and two “private admonition[s].”355 A datum—not reported by
the North Carolina Commission in its recent reports—was resignations
during investigation: The Georgia Commission reported nine judges
resigned in 2020 during investigation.356
The 2006 Georgia report noted one judge resigned during
investigation. The Commission issued three private reprimands and one
public reprimand that year.357 A review of the annual reports from 2005–
2020358 shows similar results, in terms of private and public
admonishments, formal charges filed, and recommendations for public
discipline, in Georgia and North Carolina.
The similarity of results reported by the North Carolina and Georgia
Commissions do not suggest a pressing need for the reappearance of the
appearance of impropriety standard in the former state. The absence of
any significant disparity in action by the North Carolina and Georgia
Commissions may also mean the appearance standard has little or no effect
on judicial misconduct. Of course, North Carolina’s experience does not
prove the appearance of impropriety standard has no positive effect on
judicial conduct.
The Center for Judicial Ethics of the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) gives an annual overview of judicial discipline in its Winter issue
of the Judicial Conduct Reporter. The Winter 2021 issue listed a total of
127 public judicial discipline proceedings among the states during 2020.359
Eleven were removed from office, and another thirteen retired or resigned
in lieu of discipline.360 Seven were suspended without pay for varying
lengths of time, and eighty-five were publicly admonished or
reprimanded.361 The Winter 2013 issue of Judicial Conduct Reporter
reported thirteen judges were removed from office (two were former
judges), and twenty-four resigned or retired in lieu of discipline in 2012.362
355. Id. at 7.
356. Id.
357. ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. QUALIFICATIONS COMM’N OF GA.: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 16–17,
https://gajqc.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2021/05/Annual-Report-2006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HM8L-6YXM].
358. See Annual Reports, THE JUD. QUALIFICATIONS COMM’N OF GA. (last visited Mar. 4, 2022),
https://gajqc.gov/annual-reports/ [https://perma.cc/K8CD-KAQV] (reports for 2015 and 2016 are not
included).
359. State Judicial Discipline in 2020, JUD. CONDUCT RPTR., Winter 2021, at 2,
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/60631/JCR_Winter_2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D6KL-X2DU].
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. State Judicial Discipline in 2012, JUD. CONDUCT RPTR., Winter 2013, at 1,

(REVISED) FINAL ARTICLE - PROFESSOR ARIENS (2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

684

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

5/17/22 5:11 PM

[Vol. 70

Ten were suspended, and ninety-seven received some public censure or
admonition.363
These national numbers suggest the public discipline of judges is
modest. Neither these numbers nor the specific reports from the four states
examined indicates a particularly important role for the duty to avoid an
appearance of impropriety.
V. CONCLUSION
Charles Gardner Geyh, co-reporter of the 2007 Model Code,
concluded in a 2007 essay that the appearance of impropriety standard has
served as “a means to promote public confidence in the judiciary.”364 ABA
Codes of Judicial Conduct, courts, and judicial conduct organizations
regularly make this claim. Unfortunately, empirical evidence supporting
this assertion does not exist.
Some polling data indicates the public generally trusts the federal
judiciary more than the other branches of government. A Gallup Poll
assessing the public’s trust of the three branches of the federal government
since 1972 indicates broad trust in the federal judiciary.365 Other polling
data suggest voters favorably view state judicial branches. For example,
a 2019 survey of 1,000 voters for the NCSC found 65% of respondents
had a favorable view of state courts, and the same percentage favorably
viewed federal courts.366 More specifically, 54% believed state courts
were impartial, though just 49% believed courts were unbiased.367 These
were “soft” numbers, the polling company GBA wrote in its 2014 Report
to NCSC, because “most voters do not think about the courts regularly and
do not hold firm opinions of the courts one way or another.”368
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/15524/jcr-winter-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJP46M4C].
363. Id.
364. Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an Age of Individual
Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE
MEDIA 21, 39–40 (Keith J. Bybee, ed., 2007).
365. Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in Judicial Branch Up, Executive Branch Down, GALLUP (Sept. 20,
2017),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/219674/trust-judicial-branch-executive-branch-down.aspx
[https://perma.cc/R855-JCFX]. The Poll shows significant trust in the judiciary from its initial survey
in 1972, which occurred just before the Watergate scandal became widespread knowledge. Id.
366. Memorandum from GBAO to National Center for State Courts (Jan. 3, 2020), at 2,
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/16731/sosc_2019_survey_analysis_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LGS-L2M8].
367. Id. at 3.
368. Memorandum from GBA Strategies to National Center for State Courts (Dec. 4, 2014), at
2,
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/17804/2014-state-of-state-courts-survey12042014.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9KJ-EHTL].
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The public’s lack of interest may be a sign of good news, much like
the case when sports fans talk about the game or match, not the officiating.
But this also makes it impossible to learn whether a code of judicial
conduct gains or keeps public trust in state courts. Voters who rarely think
about state courts are quite unlikely to know and consider codes of judicial
conduct. And if they know little or nothing about those codes, the
importance to public confidence of the particular “appearance of
impropriety” standard in those codes is likely unknowable.369
Public ignorance of the ethical duties of judges is unlikely to change.
But public confidence in judges may be gained indirectly. The legal
profession can assist the public by explaining the value of an appearance
of impropriety standard. That requires those supporting the appearance
standard to articulate, in a more granular fashion, its reasons for doing so.
The ABA’s decision to retain the standard in 2007, and the decision
of nearly all states to keep the appearance standard in their judicial conduct
codes, demonstrates continuing support for an appearance standard in the
legal profession. But why does the profession still support this standard?
The answer surely cannot be because it has existed for a long time. That
violates Oliver Wendell Holmes’s injunction.370 One reason may be its
facility as a “catch-all”371 when substantive disciplinary rules failed to
cover a particular case. A catch-all standard closes “loopholes” which a
tainted judge might otherwise use to escape disciplinary sanction. But
when the CCJ adopted Resolution 3, it offered no explanation for its
conclusion. Little evidence exists that miscreant judges have been
disciplined only due to the existence of an appearance of impropriety
standard. It’s time for supporters of the appearance of impropriety
standard to articulate how it remains crucial to public confidence in the
courts.

369. See, e.g., Richard E. Flamm, The History of Judicial Disqualification in America, 52
JUDGES’ J. 12, 14–15 (2013) (suggesting amendment of Michigan’s judicial disqualification rules to
include appearance of impropriety standard “resulted in broad public awareness,” though evidence for
this statement is thin).
370. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 468 (1897) (“Most
of the things we do, we do for no better reason than that our fathers have done them or that our
neighbors do them, and the same is true of a larger part than we suspect of what we think.”).
371. Abramson, Appearance, supra note 276, at 59.

